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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
TWO ESSAYS ON THE  
RECOMMENDATION BEHAVIOR OF MULTI-LINE SALESPEOPLE 
 
 This dissertation consists of two essays in which we examine the recommendation 
behavior of multi-line salespeople. Multi-line salespeople are those who are able to 
choose among overlapping, competing manufacturers’ products to make a 
recommendation to their customers. In this dissertation, we seek to explain why and how 
multi-line salespeople may recommend particular products to their customers.  
 In the first essay, we examine why salespeople may recommend a particular 
product. Manufacturers frequently face the challenge of motivating distributor 
salespeople to focus efforts on their products rather than on their competitors’. Thus, 
manufacturers often rely on outcome (e.g., rewards) and behavior (e.g., training) controls. 
We refer to these as external controls because they reflect mechanisms by which one firm 
directs another firm’s employees. External controls tend to raise concerns among 
salespeople about the appropriateness of being influenced by an outside firm, which can 
be alleviated by seeking cues about their managers’ external controls. The results of a 
three-source, multilevel study suggests that manufacturers can enhance the ability of 
salesperson external controls to drive focused effort (i.e., recommendations) by 
increasing similar sales manager external controls; however, increasing dissimilar 
controls may reduce the positive impact of salesperson external controls on their focused 
effort. 
 In the second essay, we examine how salespeople may recommend a particular 
product. The process of how purchase decisions are made by customers is well-known in 
the literature (i.e., self decision-making); however, to date, there has not been a 
complementary understanding of how purchase decisions are made for customers (i.e., 
self-other decision-making). The results from a qualitative study involving 71 covert 
participant observation encounters with salespeople across 71 store locations of 3 
retailers indicate a three-step recommendation process: goals, strategies, and 
recommendations. Drawing upon field observations and the decision-making literature, 
we show that salespeople emphasize different goals when recommending products than 
customers making decisions for themselves. We also complement prior research by 
expanding the scope of known decision-making strategies (self and self-other 
iii 
lexicographic) and surfacing a new decision-making strategy (product homogenization). 
Finally, we identify three recommendation types, and link the steps in the process model 
via a set of integrating propositions. 
KEYWORDS: salesforce, recommendation, focused effort, external controls, self-other 
decision-making 
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This dissertation consists of two essays which examine the recommendation 
behavior of multi-line salespeople. Multi-line salespeople are those who are able to 
choose among overlapping, competing manufacturers’ products to make a 
recommendation to their customer. For example, a business-to-business salesperson may 
have ten different printer manufacturers to choose from when recommending a printer to 
customers, or a business-to-consumer salesperson may have six different appliance 
manufacturers to choose from when recommending an electric range to customers. We 
take two approaches to understanding the recommendation behavior of multi-line 
salespeople: why products are recommended, and how products are recommended. In the 
first essay we draw upon primary, multi-level, multi-source, empirical data to examine 
external controls, and explain why salespeople recommend a particular manufacturer’s 
products to customers. In the second essay, we draw upon observations from an 
inductive, covert, participant observation study to examine the process of how 
salespeople make recommendations for customers. 
In the first essay, we examine the challenge faced by manufacturers in motivating 
distributor salespeople to recommend their products rather than their competitors’ 
products. To address this challenge, manufacturers often rely on outcome (e.g., financial 
rewards) and behavior (e.g., product training) controls. Controls are defined as “an 
organization’s set of procedures for monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating 
its employees” (Anderson and Oliver 1987, p. 76).  Thus, manufacturer controls are 
referred to here as external controls because they reflect mechanisms by which one firm 
directs another firm’s employees. Surprisingly, despite their pervasiveness in practice, 
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there is little research on external controls (for an exception see Coughlan and Joseph 
2012).  
External outcome control refers to the extent to which a manufacturer monitors 
and provides rewards and recognition for the sales of its products by another firm’s 
employees (e.g., Challagalla and Shervani 1996). The most common financial rewards 
are distributor-approved SPIFs, which refer to commissions a manufacturer pays directly 
to the distributor’s salesforce for sales of its products (Zoltners, Shinha, and Lorimer 
2006). External behavior control refers to the extent to which a manufacturer provides 
direction to another firm’s employees on the process of selling its products (e.g., 
Challagalla and Shervani 1996). Firms may focus on the process of selling by providing 
direction on the activities salespeople or their managers should engage in (e.g., number of 
sales calls to make) and/or by improving their capabilities through training and coaching. 
External controls may be targeted to individuals within a single level (e.g., 
salespeople) or across levels (e.g., salespeople and sales managers). To date, however, 
most research has focused on within-level analysis. Furthermore, the few studies 
exploring external controls have focused on one type of control and within-level analysis. 
As such, we address an important gap in the literature by focusing on external outcome 
and behavior controls aimed at both salespeople and their managers (i.e., cross-level 
controls). 
In contrast with internal controls (i.e., mechanisms to direct a firm’s own 
employees), salespeople are not obligated to comply with external controls, thus, have the 
freedom to choose whether to accede to their influence or not. Salespeople may view 
10 
 
external controls as beneficial for achieving their own goals; however external controls 
may raise concerns about the appropriateness of being influenced by an outside firm. This 
research draws on the legitimacy literature and on social learning theory to suggest that 
salespeople are likely to look to legitimate authority figures (i.e., sales managers) 
(Ahearne et al. 2013) for cues which serve to alleviate concerns and guide their behavior 
(Bandura 1977; Tost 2011). We propose that an important cue to salespeople is whether 
their sales manager is also influenced by these external controls. 
Combining the two types of external controls (outcome and behavior) with levels 
of external controls (salesperson and sales manager), yields two interactions in which 
salesperson and sales manager controls are similar (i.e., both salesperson and sales 
manager receive outcome control or behavior control) and two interactions in which 
salesperson and sales manager controls are dissimilar (i.e., salesperson receives outcome 
control and sales manager receives behavior control, or vice versa). We explore the 
impact of the interaction effects of external salesperson controls and external sales 
manager controls on a salesperson’s manufacturer-focused effort, or the extent to which a 
salesperson pursues opportunities to sell the products of a particular manufacturer. It 
reflects the effort salespeople expend in proactively looking for opportunities, seeking 
customers, and making calls specifically to recommend a particular manufacturer’s 
products. Although manufacturer-focused effort is important, manufacturers are also 
interested in knowing whether this increased effort towards recommendations manifests 
in greater sales of their products. Accordingly, we also examine the effect of focused 
effort on manufacturer-focused performance, which refers to the volume of sales a 
distributor salesperson obtains for a particular manufacturer’s products.  
11 
 
The theoretical framework is tested using a unique data set from downstream 
distributor salespeople and their sales managers recruited from an international imaging 
products and solutions manufacturer with more than $4 billion in annual revenues. This 
setting is particularly suitable for the study because of the industry’s (and particular 
manufacturer’s) reliance on external controls. We collected the cross-level data in three 
stages. First, 2,111 downstream distributor salespeople were e-mailed a description of the 
study and a link to the online survey. Second, upon completion of the salesperson 
surveys, we linked individual distributor salespeople to their sales managers through the 
manufacturer’s database, then e-mailed sales managers a link to an online survey. Each 
sales manager’s survey was tailored to include a portion that assessed the focused effort 
of each of their salespeople who had previously completed a survey. Of the 2,111 
distributor salespeople contacted, we received 434 responses (a 20.5% response rate). 
These 434 distributor salespeople reported to 211 unique sales managers. Of these unique 
sales managers, 102 responded (a 48.3% response rate). Managers reported on an average 
of 1.97 salespeople; therefore, our results reflect 201 unique salesperson–manager dyads. 
Third, we linked each dyad of survey responses to each salesperson’s objective sales 
volume for the product category of interest from the participating manufacturer’s sales 
database. Such a design accounts for the nested nature of salesperson–sales manager 
relationships, reduces concerns about common method bias, and affords the opportunity 
to test cross-level interactions.   
The findings from our research suggest that manufacturers can enhance the ability 
of salesperson external controls (outcome and behavior) to drive focused effort (i.e., 
recommendations) by increasing similar sales manager external controls (outcome and 
12 
behavior); however, increasing sales manager external outcome control reduces the 
positive impact of salespeople’s external behavior control (i.e., dissimilar controls) on 
their focused effort. 
In the second essay, we examine the process of how salespeople make a 
recommendation to customers. The process of how decisions are made for oneself is well-
known in the literature (i.e., self decision-making); however, to date, there has not been a 
complementary understanding of how decisions are made for others, as in the case of 
salesperson recommendations to a customer (i.e., self-other decision-making). The self-
other decision-making research which has emerged to date (e.g., Beisswanger et al. 2003; 
Polman 2010; 2012; Wray and Stone 2005), tends to focus on contextual differences 
between self and self-other decision-making (Beisswanger et al. 2003; Wray and Stone 
2005). For example, research compares self and self-other decision-making in terms of 
the amount of information sources consulted (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, and Frey 2005), the 
indulgence of choices (Laran 2010), and the risk aversion of choice (Beisswanger et al. 
2003). Importantly, although the literature has suggested that self and self-other decision-
making are made via different processes, prior research has yet to explore these 
differences (Lu, Xie, and Xu 2012; Wray and Stone 2005). 
The insights provided in this research are based on a grounded theory approach 
(e.g., Glaser and Straus 1967; Spiggle 1994; Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1990). In 
particular, the first author went undercover to assume the role of a customer and engaged 
in 71 selling encounters at 71 different locations with actual salespeople from large 
retailers, across three different retail chains and four different states. This study involved 
deception such that the retail salespeople believed that they were selling to a real 
13 
 
potential customer. Such an approach allows the salesperson-customer experience to 
unfold naturally (Belk, Sherry, and Wallendorf 1988), which affords a richer knowledge 
of the topic area and data that is not contrived (Wilson 2001). Moreover, this approach 
lends credibility to our findings by producing unfiltered, naturalistic data, which does not 
suffer from informants’ limited memory recall (Finn 2001), discrepancies between 
reported and actual behavior, and a variety of desirability biases that may occur with 
surveys, off-site interviews, and focus groups (Friedrichs and Ludtke 1975). We covertly 
audio-recorded the 71 sales encounters with retail salespeople in their natural setting (i.e., 
retail stores) (Bradford 2015; Canniford and Shankar 2013; Schouten and McAlexander 
1995) as well as the first author’s observations immediately following each encounter 
(Canniford and Shankar 2013; Peñaloza 1994; Tumbat and Belk 2011). The audio 
recordings were transcribed by a third-party transcription service. 
The findings from this research indicate a three-step recommendation process: 
goals, strategies, and recommendations. Drawing upon the participant observation study 
and the self and self-other decision-making literatures, we show that retail salespeople 
emphasize different goals when recommending products than customers do when making 
decisions for themselves. We also complement prior research by expanding the scope of 
previously known decision-making strategies (self-other lexicographic, self-other equal 
weighting) as well as surfacing a new decision-making strategy (product 
homogenization). Finally, we identify three types of recommendations. The steps of the 
process are then linked with a set of integrating propositions. Doing so provides 
customers with a “roadmap” for how salespeople may come to recommend the products 
14 
they do, such that customers can then determine the extent to which they integrate the 
recommendation into their own decision-making. 
Through both essays of this dissertation, we aim to examine the recommendation 
behavior of multi-line salespeople; heretofore, an under-researched, yet highly prevalent 
practice. Thus, this dissertation is positioned to contribute to the sales and sales 
management marketing literature, as well as the self-other decision-making literature by 
forwarding the external factors which influence a salesperson’s recommendation 
behavior, as well as the process model of how recommendations are made. 
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2 External Controls: How One Firm Governs Another Firm’s Salesforce 
2.1 Introduction 
Distributors frequently carry similar products from competing manufacturers 
(e.g., Hughes and Ahearne 2010). For example, distributors in diverse industries such as 
electronics, industrial equipment, furniture, printers, and hospital equipment tend to sell 
competing products from multiple manufacturers. Consequently, distributor salespeople 
can focus their efforts on selling any of the competing manufacturers’ products. A major 
challenge for manufacturers, therefore, is how to motivate distributor salespeople to focus 
their efforts on selling their particular products rather than on other manufacturers’ 
products. This challenge is particularly daunting because it involves influencing another 
firm’s employees (i.e., sales force). 
Manufacturers often address this challenge by relying on outcome and/or behavior 
controls targeted at distributor salespeople. Outcome control refers to firms monitoring 
salespeople’s sales results and rewarding them accordingly (Oliver and Anderson 1994). 
For example, manufacturers such as 3M, Sony, and John Deere provide financial rewards 
or special performance incentives funds (SPIFs) directly to distributor salespeople for 
selling their products (Zoltners, Shinha, and Lorimer 2006) (Table 2.1). In contrast, 
behavior control focuses on the process that salespeople use for generating sales (Cravens 
et al. 1993). For example, manufacturers provide distributor salespeople with product 
and/or sales skills training to motivate them to expend effort on selling their products. 
These manufacturer outcome and behavior controls constitute external controls because 
they reflect an outside firm’s (i.e., manufacturer’s) efforts at directing another firm’s (i.e., 
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distributor’s) employees. Surprisingly, despite their pervasiveness in practice, there is 
little research on external controls (for an exception see Coughlan and Joseph 2012). 
Moreover, there is scant research on whether external controls serve their intended 
purpose—i.e., to focus distributor salesperson effort on a particular manufacturer’s 
products. Consequently, research provides little guidance to manufacturers on whether 
their investments in these controls pay off.   
This research makes two key contributions to the literature. First, we advance the 
concept of external controls, or mechanisms by which one firm directs another firm’s 
employees, and elaborates on how they affect a distributor salesperson’s manufacturer-
focused effort. The sparse research on external controls is in stark contrast with the 
extensive literature on internal controls—that is, firms’ use of outcome and/or behavior 
controls to direct their own employees (e.g., Anderson and Oliver 1987; Cravens et al. 
1993). Unlike internal controls, which are legitimized by the employer–employee 
contract, external controls are outside of such a contract (French and Raven 1959; 
Johnson 1994; Tyler 2006). Thus, salespeople who receive external controls may 
question their legitimacy. Therefore, we argue that the effect of external controls is 
largely contingent upon salespeople being able to address these legitimacy concerns. 
Our second contribution, therefore, stems from demonstrating nuanced and novel 
cross-level interactive effects of external controls. External controls may give rise to a 
tension between distributor salespeople’s desire to respond to them (e.g., to a 
manufacturer’s financial incentives and/or training) and their concerns about the 
appropriateness of doing so (Radin and Predmore 2002). To address this tension, 
salespeople are likely to assess the legitimacy of being influenced by these external 
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controls (e.g., Tost 2011). Specifically, salespeople are likely to look to legitimate 
authority figures (i.e., sales managers) (Ahearne et al. 2013) for cues to guide their 
behavior (Bandura 1977; Tost 2011). We propose that an important cue to salespeople is 
whether their sales manager is also influenced by these external controls. 
Similar to those of salespeople, a sales manager’s external controls can be of two 
types: outcome or behavior. Consequently, this raises the question whether the type of 
sales manager’s external control is pertinent in influencing a salesperson’s effort. We 
argue that it is. We predict that the degree of effort salespeople expend on a 
manufacturer’s products will depend on whether their external controls are similar or 
dissimilar to those of their managers (Figure 2.2). Specifically, when distributor 
salespeople and their sales managers are recipients of similar external controls (e.g., both 
are recipients of external outcome [or behavior] control), salespeople should be motivated 
to expend greater effort on selling a manufacturer’s products. However, when distributor 
salespeople and their managers are recipients of dissimilar external controls, the effects 
are nuanced. We predict that if a manager receives behavior control while a salesperson 
receives outcome control, salespeople will be motivated to expend greater effort; the 
reverse, however, reduces effort. To the best of our knowledge, prior studies on controls 
have not considered the interactive effects of controls across levels of analysis (e.g., 
salesperson and sales manager). Thus, the present research addresses calls from scholars 
to better understand the contingent effects of controls across multiple levels of the firm 
(e.g., Krafft et al. 2012; Miao and Evans 2013). 
We test our theoretical framework using a unique data set compiled from three 
different sources (salespeople, sales managers, and manufacturer objective sales data) 
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across two hierarchical levels (salespeople and sales managers) and across many 
distributors. Such a design accounts for the nested nature of salesperson–sales manager 
relationships, reduces concerns about common method bias, and affords the opportunity 
to test cross-level interactions. The next section synthesizes the relevant literature on 
internal and external controls and legitimacy. Then, we present the hypotheses. We 
subsequently describe the sample, methodology, and results. Finally, we provide 
implications for theory and practice, address limitations, and offer guidance for further 
research. 
2.2 Background 
A control system is defined as “an organization’s set of procedures for 
monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating its employees” (Anderson and 
Oliver 1987, p. 76). The literature on controls can be organized along two dimensions: 
source of the control (i.e., internal or external) and level at which these controls are used 
(i.e., within-level or cross-level) (Table 2.2). Internal controls refer to controls that a firm 
uses to govern its own employees, while external controls are controls that a firm uses to 
govern another firm’s employees1. Internal and external controls may be targeted to 
individuals within a single level (e.g., salespeople) or across levels (e.g., salespeople and 
sales managers). To date, however, most research has focused on within-level analysis. 
Furthermore, the few studies exploring external controls (for a summary, see Table 2.3) 
have focused on one type of control and within-level analysis. As such, we address an 
1 Previous research suggests that manufacturers may also rely on external firm-level controls such as 
providing slotting allowances to distributors (Gilliland 2003). These firm-level external controls are 
targeted at distributor firms to carry their products rather than individuals within the firm and are, thus, not 
a focus of the study. 
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important gap in the literature by focusing on external outcome and behavior controls 
aimed at both salespeople and their managers (i.e., cross-level controls, bottom-right-
hand corner of Table 2.2). 
Examining external controls is important because they provide manufacturers a 
way to govern downstream salespeople who have a more direct and proximal influence 
on customer purchasing decisions than they do (Badrinarayanan and Laverie 2011). 
Importantly, they can be used to govern people at multiple levels within downstream 
relationships (e.g., salespeople and sales managers), thereby providing manufacturers 
with more opportunities for targeted influence within a downstream reselling firm. Thus, 
although it is possible for a particular manufacturer to target an individual salesperson 
with both behavior and outcome controls, the focus here is on the target of external 
controls across levels of individuals (i.e., salespeople and sales managers). Similar to 
internal controls, we suggest that external control systems consist of outcome and 
behavior controls, and we distinguish them in the following subsections. 
2.2.1 External Outcome Control  
External outcome control refers to the extent to which a manufacturer monitors 
and provides rewards and recognition for the sales of its products by another firm’s 
employees (e.g., Challagalla and Shervani 1996). Manufacturers may provide financial 
rewards and recognition for achieving a particular sales target or on a transactional basis 
for individual sales of their products. The most common financial rewards are distributor-
approved SPIFs, which refer to commissions a manufacturer pays directly to the 
distributor’s sales force for sales of its products (Zoltners, Shinha, and Lorimer 2006). 
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SPIFs are typically offered as debit cards, gift cards, or checks sent directly to 
salespeople and/or their sales managers (Table 2.1 and Appendix A1.1). Prior research 
suggests that contingent rewards (e.g., SPIFs) enhance extrinsic motivation of recipients 
(e.g., Oliver and Anderson 1994) and, ultimately, focus greater effort on a particular 
manufacturer (Coughlan and Joseph 2012). This effort, which we call manufacturer-
focused effort, reflects the extent to which a salesperson pursues opportunities to sell a 
particular manufacturer’s products. 
2.2.2 External Behavior Control 
External behavior control refers to the extent to which a manufacturer provides 
direction to another firm’s employees on the process of selling its products (e.g., 
Challagalla and Shervani 1996). Firms may focus on the process of selling by providing 
direction on the activities salespeople or their managers should engage in (e.g., number of 
sales calls to make) and/or by improving their capabilities through training and coaching. 
Distributors that carry products of competing manufacturers are highly unlikely to grant a 
particular manufacturer permission to monitor and guide the daily activities of their 
employees. Instead, distributors are more likely to allow manufacturers to provide 
coaching and training for selling their specific products (Gilliland 2003). Thus, we focus 
on external behavior control in terms of the coaching and training a manufacturer 
provides to a distributor’s salespeople and sales managers. 
Such training is often directed by manufacturer field representatives, who visit 
distributors and train salespeople on their products and sales methods, attend sales calls, 
and provide local resources as needed to aid in the selling process. It may also involve 
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training distributor sales managers on how to coach and train their salespeople on the 
manufacturer’s products. This training develops distributor salespeople’s and managers’ 
manufacturer-specific skills and abilities, which is likely to increase their confidence and 
intrinsic motivation to sell the manufacturer’s products and, ultimately, their 
manufacturer-focused effort (Anderson and Oliver 1987; Pettijohn, Pettijohn, and Taylor 
2002; Román, Ruiz, and Munuera 2002). 
2.2.3 External Controls: A Legitimacy Perspective 
Prior research suggests that (internal) controls are likely to enhance effort (e.g., 
Miao and Evans 2013). Outcome control does so by stimulating extrinsic motivation, 
while behavior control does so by enhancing intrinsic motivation (Cravens et al. 1993; 
Oliver and Anderson 1994). However, there is an important distinction between internal 
and external controls that is likely to qualify these relationships. Employees are likely to 
view internal controls as stemming from an obligatory source. The reason is that 
employees recognize employers’ or managers’ right to prescribe actions per the terms of 
their employment (Ouchi 1980). Thus, employees are likely to feel obligated to comply 
with internal controls. In contrast, external controls are attempts by one firm to influence 
another firm’s employees. Such controls lie outside the employer–employee contract. 
Thus, distributor salespeople are likely to perceive external controls as nonobligatory 
influences by an external firm (Ouchi 1980). 
In the absence of obligation, distributor salespeople have the freedom to choose 
whether to accede to the influence of a manufacturer’s external controls. On the one 
hand, distributor salespeople may view manufacturer outcome control (e.g., financial 
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rewards) and behavior control (e.g., training) as beneficial for achieving their own goals. 
On the other hand, nonobligatory influences often elicit concerns or questions about 
legitimacy (e.g., Fisher 2007; Wazana 2000). Legitimacy refers to “a generalized 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” 
(Suchman 1995, p. 574). Thus, distributor salespeople may question whether their 
decision-making has been compromised in favor of a particular manufacturer over the 
interests of their customers (Fisher 2007). Salespeople may raise questions such as, “Are 
these SPIFs clouding my judgment in doing the right thing for my customer?” or “Am I 
letting this manufacturer’s training unduly influence me?” These questions give rise to a 
tension between being influenced by external controls and the appropriateness of doing 
so. 
How do salespeople resolve this tension? Social learning theory suggests that 
people often search for cues from role models to address such quandaries (Bandura 
1977). In particular, employees look to authority figures such as managers for signals on 
how to behave (e.g., Handfield and Baumer 2006) or to legitimize their actions (Tost 
2011). Observing these cues leads people to adopt or avoid certain behaviors (Lam, 
Kraus, and Ahearne 2010). Indeed, research on social learning theory reinforces these 
arguments and finds that learning from referents (e.g., managers) influences the degree to 
which employees learn and adopt behaviors (Bandura 1977; Fullagar et al. 1995; 
Hartline, Maxham, and McKee 2000; Schillewaert et al. 2005). In particular, sales 
managers being recipients of external controls provides legitimacy to the controls and 
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alleviates salesperson tension (e.g., Tyler 2006).2 Thus, we anticipate that the relationship 
between a manufacturer’s external controls to distributor salespeople and their 
manufacturer-focused effort will be contingent on the external controls targeted to the 
sales manager. 
2.3 Contingency Hypotheses 
We explore the impact of the interaction effects of external salesperson controls 
and external sales manager controls on a salesperson’s manufacturer-focused effort, or 
the extent to which a salesperson pursues opportunities to sell the products of a particular 
manufacturer. It reflects the effort salespeople expend in proactively looking for 
opportunities, seeking customers, and making calls specifically to sell a particular 
manufacturer’s products. The emphasis on effort is consistent with recent research that 
highlights that (internal) controls enhance selling effort (Miao and Evans 2013). 
Moreover, effort is a key outcome variable in recent multi-brand (Badrinarayanan and 
Laverie 2011) and multi-manufacturer sales research (Hughes and Ahearne 2010). That 
being said, although manufacturer-focused effort (henceforth, focused effort) is 
important, manufacturers are also interested in knowing whether this effort manifests in 
greater sales of their products. Accordingly, we also examine the effect of focused effort 
on manufacturer-focused performance (henceforth, focused performance), which refers 
                                                          
2 Sales managers are less likely to experience the same level of tension regarding external controls as their 
salespeople for two key reasons. First, sales managers are more likely to have approved the use of external 
controls (or have been a part of the approval process) within their firm. Second, they are an additional step 
removed from customers, which reduces their concerns about ramifications associated with being unduly 




to the volume of sales a distributor salesperson obtains for a particular manufacturer’s 
products. As such, this is an objective measure of performance. 
Figure 2.2 presents two dimensions through which we explore the contingency 
effects in this study. The first dimension is the type of salesperson external control 
(outcome or behavior), and the second is the type of sales manager external control 
(outcome or behavior). Combined, these dimensions yield two interactions in which 
salesperson and sales manager controls are similar (i.e., both salesperson and sales 
manager receive outcome control or behavior control) and two interactions in which 
salesperson and sales manager controls are dissimilar (i.e., salesperson receives outcome 
control and sales manager receives behavior control, or vice versa).   
2.3.1 Similar External Controls: Salesperson Outcome × Manager Outcome 
Manufacturers that extend external outcome control tend to provide financial 
rewards (i.e., SPIFs) for selling their products. Sales managers’ receipt of external 
outcome control provides a salient norm and legitimacy to salespeople who may be 
questioning the appropriateness of acting on their own extrinsic motivation stemming 
from external outcome control (Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 2010). Furthermore, sales 
managers who are recipients of these financial incentives (i.e., external outcome control 
is high) are likely to be extrinsically motivated to promote the manufacturer’s products 
(Anderson and Oliver 1987; Bradford et al. 2010; Oliver and Anderson 1994). This 
motivation is likely to manifest itself in explicit encouragement or additional tacit 
approval of the manufacturer’s products to their salespeople. Such manager endorsement 
should mitigate doubts about legitimacy, thus encouraging salespeople to respond to their 
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own external outcome control by putting forth greater effort on selling the manufacturer’s 
products. 
Alternatively, when sales managers receive no financial incentives or recognition 
from manufacturers (i.e., external outcome control is low), they are less likely to endorse 
the manufacturer’s products (e.g., Palmatier et al. 2009). Thus, salespeople are less likely 
to perceive cues from their manager in support of the manufacturer’s products. 
Accordingly, salespeople’s legitimacy concerns about responding to a manufacturer’s 
external behavior control are likely to persist. In this case, salespeople are less likely to 
be influenced by a manufacturer’s external outcome control. 
H1:  An increase in sales manager external outcome control positively 
affects the relationship between salesperson external outcome 
control and focused effort. 
2.3.2 Similar External Controls: Salesperson Behavior × Manager Behavior 
Manufacturers that extend external behavior control attempt to intrinsically 
motivate distributor salespeople by providing guidance on the process of selling their 
products. This guidance is often in the form of coaching and training from local field 
representatives (Gilliland 2003). Salespeople who observe their sales manager attending 
training sessions or accepting coaching from a manufacturer receive a strong signal 
regarding the legitimacy of being influenced by these external controls (e.g., Tost 2011). 
These signals help alleviate salespeople’s concerns about whether such training is unduly 
influencing them. Furthermore, managers who receive manufacturer coaching and 
training become more knowledgeable and confident about its products (Miao, Evans, and 
Zou 2007), which is likely to boost their intrinsic motivation to provide assistance to 
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salespeople in selling the manufacturer’s products (Miao and Evans 2013). The receipt of 
supervisory assistance adds to the legitimacy of a manufacturer’s external behavior 
control (e.g., Tyler 2006). These cues should alleviate salespeople’s doubts about 
embracing a manufacturer’s external behavior control and putting forth effort on selling 
its products (e.g., Palmatier et al. 2009). 
Alternatively, when sales managers receive little training or coaching from 
manufacturers (i.e., external behavior control is low), salespeople’s doubts about 
responding to their own external behavior control are likely to endure. Furthermore, 
managers are less knowledgeable about the manufacturer’s products and therefore are 
less likely to provide assistance to or be supportive of their products (e.g., Palmatier et al. 
2009). Thus, salespeople are likely to have legitimacy concerns about a manufacturer’s 
external behavior control and are less likely to expend effort in response to the external 
outcome control. 
H2:  An increase in sales manager external behavior control positively 
affects the relationship between salesperson external behavior 
control and focused effort. 
2.3.3 Dissimilar External Controls: Salesperson Outcome × Manager Behavior 
We now consider the case of dissimilar controls in which the salesperson receives 
external outcome control and the sales manager receives external behavior control. As we 
argued previously, sales managers’ receipt of coaching and training from manufacturers 
(i.e., higher levels of external behavior control) should legitimize the external controls in 
the eyes of salespeople (Tyler 2006). Furthermore, sales managers who receive training 
from manufacturers are more knowledgeable about their products (Challagalla and 
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Shervani 1996) and thus are more likely to encourage and assist their salespeople in 
selling a particular manufacturer’s products (Palmatier et al. 2009). Guidance from their 
manager reinforces salespeople’s own extrinsic motivation (stemming from their external 
outcome control) to promote the manufacturer’s products and lessens their concerns 
about the appropriateness of acting on this motivation (Lam, Kraus, and Ahearne 2010). 
However, at low levels of manager external behavior control, salespeople’s doubts 
regarding being influenced by their own external outcome control persist. 
H3:  An increase in sales manager external behavior control positively 
 affects the relationship between salesperson external outcome 
 control and focused effort. 
2.3.4 Dissimilar External Controls: Salesperson Behavior × Manager Outcome 
In contrast with H3, we expect that when the dissimilar types of controls are 
reversed, such that the sales manager receives external outcome control and the 
salesperson receives external behavior control, the focused effort of salespeople will 
diminish. Why might this be the case? When sales managers’ external outcome control is 
higher, they are likely to be extrinsically motivated to push their salespeople to sell the 
manufacturer’s products. Alternatively, salespeople who are governed by external 
behavior control are likely to be intrinsically motivated (Challagalla and Shervani 1996; 
Oliver and Anderson 1994). The motivation literature suggests that extrinsic motivational 
influences undermine people’s intrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 
1999). Thus, salespeople who are intrinsically motivated by a manufacturer’s coaching 
and training are likely to resent pressure from their sales managers to sell the 
manufacturer’s products primarily for their own (i.e., manager’s) financial gain 
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(Offerman 2002; Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant 2011). Indeed, such financial gains 
resulting from another individual’s efforts are often construed as unfair (e.g., Tyler 1997, 
2006). These feelings of unfairness are likely to negatively affect salespeople’s focused 
effort on a manufacturer’s products, even when they believe such influence is legitimate.  
Alternatively, when sales managers’ external outcome control is lower, they will 
have less incentive to promote the products of a particular manufacturer. Thus, managers 
will provide few cues regarding their support of a manufacturer’s products. In this case, 
although salespeople will remain uncertain about the legitimacy of their own external 
behavior controls, they will not feel undermined as in the case of greater manager 
external outcome control. 
H4:  An increase in sales manager external outcome control negatively 
 affects the relationship between salesperson external behavior 
 control and focused effort. 
2.3.5 Focused Effort and Focused Performance 
Focused performance refers to the volume of sales a distributor salesperson 
obtains for a particular manufacturer’s products. We suggest a positive relationship 
between manufacturer-focused effort and focused performance for several reasons. 
Salespeople with greater focused effort proactively seek out prospects and are more 
aware of opportunities to sell a particular manufacturer’s products. Such proactive effort 
and awareness are likely to manifest in more sales opportunities, which should increase 
the salesperson’s performance with the manufacturer’s products (Fu, Richards, and Jones 
2009). Correspondingly, prior research suggests that (brand) effort is positively related to 
(brand) performance (Hughes and Ahearne 2010).  
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H5:  Focused effort is positively related to focused performance. 
2.4 Method 
2.4.1 Sample 
This study includes data from downstream distributor salespeople and their sales 
managers recruited from a large international imaging products and solutions 
manufacturer with more than $4 billion in annual revenues (see Appendix A1.2 for IRB 
approval). The participating firm sells its higher-end products through a network of 
independently owned business-to-business multiline distributors and its lower-end 
products through big-box retailers. In this study, we focus on business-to-business sales 
of multifunction printers, a prominent product category for the manufacturer, through its 
distributor network. This setting is particularly suitable for the study because of the 
industry’s and manufacturer’s reliance on external controls. For example, the 
participating firm employs field-based representatives to train and coach distributor 
salespeople and managers about its multifunction printers and how to sell them. In 
addition, the firm offers distributor salespeople and sales managers SPIFs (i.e., financial 
rewards) and recognition for selling its printers.  
We collected the cross-level data in three stages. First, the participating 
manufacturer provided us with the list of its 2,111 downstream distributor salespeople. 
We e-mailed them a description of the study, an endorsement letter from the 
manufacturer’s vice president of sales, and a link to the online survey. We made it clear 
that respondents’ answers would be submitted directly to the authors of the study. All 
distributor salespeople who completed the survey received a $10 gift card to a national 
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retailer of their choice. Second, on completion of the salesperson surveys, we linked 
individual distributor salespeople to their sales managers through the manufacturer’s 
database. We then e-mailed sales managers a description of the study and a link to an 
online survey. Each sales manager’s survey was tailored to include a portion that assessed 
the focused effort of each of their salespeople who had previously completed a survey. 
Sales managers also received a gift card for completed surveys. Of the 2,111 distributor 
salespeople contacted, we received 434 responses (a 20.5% response rate). These 434 
distributor salespeople reported to 211 unique sales managers. Of these unique sales 
managers, 102 responded (a 48.3% response rate). Managers reported on an average of 
1.97 salespeople; therefore, our results reflect 201 unique salesperson–manager dyads. 
Third, we linked each dyad of survey responses to each salesperson’s objective sales 
volume for the product category of interest from the participating manufacturer’s sales 
database. 
The first and last survey completion date quartiles showed no significant 
differences on the study variables across both salesperson and sales manager data, 
suggesting that nonresponse bias is of minimal concern (Armstrong and Overton 1977). 
The average sales experience for salespeople and sales managers was 15.11 and 16.03 
years, respectively. Men constituted 75% of salesperson and 87% of manager 
respondents, which is typical for this particular industry. 
2.4.2 Construct Measures 
We conducted eight hour-long round table meetings with selected managers, 
program coordinators, and field representatives of the participating firm to ensure the 
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appropriateness of our measures and approach. We adapted multi-item scales to the 
manufacturer context. Unless otherwise noted, all items were anchored by “strongly 
disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (5). Appendix A1.3 reports the items, factor loadings, 
and Cronbach’s alphas for each scale.  
2.4.2.1 External Outcome and Behavior Controls of Salespeople and Sales Managers 
Prior research on external outcome control suggests that manufacturers typically 
provide SPIFs and recognition to distributor salespeople for selling their products (e.g., 
Caldieraro and Coughlan 2007; Coughlan and Joseph 2012). These rewards parallel those 
that Challagalla and Shervani (1996) identify as (internal) output rewards, and thus we 
adapted the four items from their scale for our context. For example, the original scale 
asks salespeople about whether they are rewarded for achieving “market share targets.” 
In our context, manufacturers typically do not set market share targets for individual 
distributor salespeople; thus, we changed this item to obtaining “compensation for selling 
the manufacturer’s products.” We dropped one item from the Challagalla and Shervani 
scale because it was irrelevant to the study context. This item pertained to promotion 
opportunities, which outside manufacturers cannot provide to distributor salespeople. The 
external outcome control scale for the sales managers is similar to that of salespeople. 
The main difference is that sales managers are typically rewarded by the manufacturer for 
their salespeople’s sales, as managers do not generally generate their own sales.  
Manufacturer behavior control includes providing coaching and training on 
products. This notion of coaching and training parallels Challagalla and Shervani’s 
(1996) concept of capability information controls. Accordingly, we adapted their five 
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items to our context. Unlike the original scale, the adapted items are manufacturer 
specific (e.g., providing advice during joint sales calls). We excluded the item “My 
manager has standards by which my selling skills are evaluated” because manufacturers 
are likely not able or allowed to impose selling standards on another firm’s sales force. In 
its place, we added two items that more explicitly capture training and coaching, which 
are important aspects of external behavior control. We collected external controls at two 
levels by having salespeople and their managers report on their own external controls 
from the focal manufacturer. 
2.4.2.2 Focused Effort 
We assessed focused effort using a scale that captures the salesperson’s proactive 
behavior in searching for, seeking out, and making calls specifically for one 
manufacturer’s products over other manufacturers’ products. This scale is adapted from 
established salesperson effort scales (e.g., Rapp et al. 2010; Badrinarayanan and Laverie 
2011; Bonney and Williams 2009; Brown and Peterson 1994; Hughes and Ahearne 
2010). In line with Hughes and Ahearne (2010), we had sales managers assess 
salesperson effort. Having effort evaluated by sales managers rather than salespeople 
alleviates concerns with both social desirability and common method biases. 
2.4.2.3 Focused Performance 
We obtained objective sales volume data for each salesperson for the focal 
product category from the participating manufacturer’s sales database. Consistent with 
prior research, we use sales volume during the one-month period in which the survey was 
administered (e.g., Hughes and Ahearne 2010). 
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2.4.2.4 Covariates  
In this research, we focus on the interplay of external controls across levels of 
analysis rather than within levels. However, given recent research that examines within-
level control system interactions (e.g., Miao and Evans 2012, 2013; Wang, Dou, and 
Zhou 2012), we also account for the interaction between salesperson external outcome 
and behavior controls. In addition, we draw from previous research to include covariates 
that are likely to influence a salesperson’s focused effort on a particular manufacturer’s 
products. These include the salesperson’s perception of the manufacturer’s reputation 
(Badrinarayanan and Laverie 2011) and the number of manufacturer products a 
salesperson is able to sell (Anderson and Weitz 1992; Frazier 1999; Hughes and Ahearne 
2010). We also control for salespeople’s sales experience (Franke and Park 2006; Fu, 
Richards, and Jones 2009), as well as their internal outcome and behavior controls 
(Challagalla and Shervani 1996). By including internal controls, we establish the impact 
of external controls beyond the traditional controls influencing salespeople. 
2.4.3 Measurement Model 
We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to assess the validity of our 
measures (Gerbing and Anderson 1988). Although the chi-square statistic is significant, 
(χ2 = 1086.17, p < .001, d.f. = 647), the model exhibits excellent fit (comparative fit index 
= .94; root mean square error of approximation = .06; standardized root mean square 
residual = .05) (Hu and Bentler 1999). Significant item loadings indicate convergent 
validity (i.e., t-values > 2). Coefficient alphas, composite reliabilities (CR), and average 
variance extracted (AVE) exceed recommendations (i.e., coefficient alpha > .70, CR > 
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.70, and AVE > .50), demonstrating both convergent and discriminant validity (Fornell 
and Larcker 1981) (Table 2.4). 
2.4.4 Model Specification 
We calculated the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) of focused effort, the 
outcome of the four hypothesized cross-level interactions. The ICC represents the 
percentage of total variance explained by the nested nature of salespeople within 
managers and resulted in an ICC of .53. As Figure 2.1 shows, the relationship between 
focused effort and focused performance is within Level 1 and therefore could be 
specified as a simple linear regression model. However, focused effort is a function of 
Level 1 variables (salesperson external outcome and behavior controls) and their 
interactions with Level 2 variables (manager external outcome and behavior controls). 
Multilevel modeling is a statistical approach that allows us to estimate the model with 
variables at both the individual and group level simultaneously, recognizing that 
salespeople working for the same manager may act similarly to each other and differently 
from other manager groups (i.e., partial interdependence) (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). 
Predicting focused effort involves a two-step approach in which focused effort is 
regressed on Level 1 indicators: 
(1) FEij =  0j + 1j(SEO)ij + 2j(SEB)ij + rij. 
Next, those intercept and slopes are regressed on the Level 2 variables: 
  0j = 00 + 01(MEO)j + 02(MEB)j + 0j, 
  1j = 10 + 11(MEO)j + 12(MEB)j + 1j, and 
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  2j = 20 + 21(MEO)j + 22(MEB)j + 1j. 
2.4.4 Addressing Endogeneity 
It is possible that the key exogenous variables in our model (i.e., salesperson 
external controls) are subject to issues of endogeneity. Specifically, a salesperson’s drive 
to respond to a survey endorsed by a particular manufacturer may have been influenced 
by the strength of the relationship quality with that manufacturer’s field representative 
involved in administering both outcome and behavior controls (e.g., Badrinarayanan and 
Laverie 2013). If so, this would result in self-selection of only particular types of 
salespeople into the study (i.e., those with high levels of relationship quality). If not 
addressed, this self-selection bias may cause an overestimation of the relationship 
between salesperson external controls and focused effort on the particular manufacturer 
(Bascle 2008). In line with Chakravarty, Kumar, and Grewal (2014) and Grewal, 
Chakravarty, and Saini (2010), to correct for this bias, we follow the steps Garen (1984) 
outlines and regress each of the salesperson external control measures on the potential 
driver (i.e., relationship quality). We regress salesperson external outcome control on the 
salesperson’s perception of his or her relationship quality with the manufacturer’s field 
representative, a three-item scale adapted from Anderson and Weitz (1992) and Palmatier 
(2008). This process yields the following predicted error equation: 
(5A)  Z1 = β3x1 + υ1,  
where Z1 is salesperson external outcome control, x1 is relationship quality with 
the field representative, β3 is the correction coefficient for relationship quality with field 
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representative, and υ1 is the standard error. Salesperson external behavior control follows 
a similar pattern. This process yields the following predicted error equation: 
(5B) Z2 = β4x2 + υ2,  
where Z2 is salesperson external behavior control, x2 is relationship quality with the 
manufacturer’s field representative, β4 is the correction coefficient for relationship quality 
with the manufacturer’s field representative, and υ2 is the standard error. We then 
multiply the estimated error coefficients from Equations 5A and 5B by their respective 
salesperson external control variable, as each error coefficient may fluctuate for each 
continuous value of the external control. Thus, combining Equations 1–4, as well as the 
control variables and endogeneity bias correction coefficients, yields: 
FEij =  00 + 01(MEO)j + 02(MEB)j + 10(SEO)ij + 11MEOj(SEO)ij + 12MEBj(SEO)ij + 
20(SEB)j + 21 MEOj(SEB)ij + 22MEBj(SEB)ij + 0j + 1j(SEO)ij + 1j(SEB)ij + 
β5j(SEO*SEB)ij + β6j(REP)ij + β7j(NUM)ij + β8j(EXP)ij + β9j(SIO)ij + β10j(SIB)ij+ αυ1ij?̂?1ij + 
αυZ1ij?̂?Z1ij + α𝜐2ij?̂?2ij + αυ2ij?̂?Z2ij + rij, 
where 
FEij = focused effort of salesperson i, 
SEOij = external outcome control of salesperson i, 
SEBij = external behavior control of salesperson i, 
MEOij = external outcome control of manager j, 
MEBij = external behavior control of manager j, 
REPij= reputation of manufacturer for salesperson i, 
NUMij = number of manufacturers available for salesperson i, 
EXPij = sales experience in years of salesperson i, 
SIOij = internal outcome control of salesperson i, 
SIBij= internal behavior control of salesperson i, 
α?̂?1ij = correction coefficient for external outcome control of salesperson i, 
?̂?Z1ij = correction coefficient × external outcome control of salesperson i, 
α?̂?2ij = correction coefficient for external behavior control of salesperson i, and 
?̂?Z2ij = correction coefficient × external behavior control of salesperson i. 
We take a similar approach for predicting the outcome of focused effort on focused 
performance, controlling for all cross-level interactions and covariates. 
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2.4.5 Hypothesis Testing 
To estimate the model, we use Mplus version 7 (Muthén and Muthén 2012) 
because of its ability to analyze complex hierarchical models using full maximum 
likelihood estimation. We first fit a baseline model with only the effects of salesperson 
external controls on focused performance through focused effort (Table 2.5, Model 1). 
We then create interaction terms by multiplying mean-centered salesperson external 
controls by mean-centered manager external controls (Aiken and West 1991). Then, we 
estimate the full hypothesized model, including the cross-level moderators (Table 2.5, 
Model 2). Standard fit indexes are not available for comparing nested models with 
Mplus; therefore, as is common practice, we compare the fit of these models using a log-
likelihood difference test (e.g., Hughes and Ahearne 2010; Wieseke et al. 2012). The 
hypothesized model including cross-level moderators fits better than the nonmoderated 
model (Δχ2 = 26.48, Δd.f. [number of free parameters] = 16, p ≤ .05), indicating that the 
inclusion of the Level 2 variables (i.e., manager external controls) into the model predicts 
the outcome variables better than a model with only within-level variables (i.e., 
salesperson external controls).  
The results of the full hypothesized model indicate that manager external outcome 
control positively interacts with salesperson external outcome control to influence 
focused effort (β = .07, p ≤ .05), providing support for H1. H2 is also supported; manager 
external behavior control positively interacts with salesperson external behavior control 
to influence focused effort (β = .03, p ≤ .01). Manager external behavior control has little 
impact on the relationship between salesperson external outcome control and focused 
effort (β = –.01, n.s.); thus, H3 is not supported. However, in support of H4, the results 
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indicate that manager external outcome control negatively interacts with salesperson 
external behavior control to influence focused effort (β = –.04, p ≤ .05). Finally, focused 
effort is positively related to focused performance, in support of H5 (β = .32, p ≤ .05).  
The results of the control variables are mixed. The interaction between 
salesperson external outcome and salesperson external behavior controls is not significant 
(β = –.01, n.s.). In addition, manufacturer reputation (β = .13, n.s.), salesperson 
experience (β = –.03, n.s.), and salesperson internal outcome control (β = .02, n.s.) have 
no significant impact on focused effort. However, the number of manufacturers the 
salesperson is able to sell for (β = –.02, p ≤ .01) and salesperson internal behavior control 
(β = –.11, p ≤ .01) are negatively related to focused effort.  
2.4.6 Cross-Level Interactions 
A major goal of this research is to understand the impact of manager external 
controls on the relationship between salesperson external controls and focused effort. 
Therefore, to better understand the significant cross-level interactions, we employ the 
two-level hierarchical linear modeling simple slope generator provided by Preacher, 
Curran, and Bauer (2006). We plot these interactions at +/– 1 standard deviation from the 
mean for manager external controls. Figures 2.3–2.5 display each of the significant 
interactions. 
The interaction plot in Figure 2.3 (H1) shows that the relationship between 
salesperson external outcome control and focused effort is positive when sales manager 
outcome control is high, but negative when sales manager outcome control is low. This 
latter finding lends support to the argument that salespeople question nonobligatory 
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influences. In this particular case, salespeople might question, for example, whether a 
manufacturer is providing higher levels of incentives because of some underlying issue or 
problem with the product (e.g., pending product discontinuation, poor quality, inventory 
glut). As expected, Figure 2.4 (H2) shows that increasing sales manager external behavior 
control positively impacts the relationship between salesperson external behavior control 
and focused effort. Figure 2.5 shows the interaction hypothesized in H4—increasing sales 
manager external outcome control negatively impacts the relationship between 
salesperson external behavior control and focused effort. The relationship becomes less 
positive (and, indeed, turns slightly negative) as sales manager external outcome control 
increases. From a theoretical standpoint, this finding provides support for our contention 
that extrinsic rewards to one party (i.e., sales manager) may undermine the intrinsic 
motivation of another party (i.e., salesperson).  
2.5 Discussion 
Despite the prevalence of external controls in practice, prior research has mostly 
focused on internal controls. Accordingly, we complement and extend the existing 
controls literature by advancing the concept of external controls. In doing so, we 
highlight two primary forms—external outcome and external behavior control—that 
upstream firms (e.g., manufacturers) can employ at multiple levels in downstream firms 
(e.g., distributors). We draw on the legitimacy and social learning literatures to suggest 
that the impact of salespeople’s external controls on their manufacturer-focused effort is 




2.5.1 Theoretical Implications 
In doing this research, we make three main theoretical contributions. First, we 
contribute to theory and empirical research in the area of within-level control systems. 
Marketing scholars have made significant contributions to the within-level internal 
control systems literature (e.g., Anderson and Oliver 1987; Jaworski 1988) (Table 2.2). 
However, a complementary stream of research on within-level external control systems is 
missing. Although recent research has modeled the optimal level of external outcome 
control (e.g., SPIFs) on individual products within a manufacturer’s product line 
(Caldieraro and Coughlan 2007) and has acknowledged the existence of external 
behavior control (e.g., training of distributor salespeople) as a tool for manufacturer field 
representatives (Badrinarayanan and Laverie 2013), such studies address these issues 
separately. Thus, we begin to coalesce theory on how one firm may govern another 
firm’s employees by positioning these issues within the overall control systems literature. 
Doing so allows for an integrative understanding of both internal and external controls, 
and begins to lay a foundation for additional integrative research on within-level controls.  
Second, although internal and external controls share some similarities, they differ 
in an important way. Internal controls stem from employers, which obligates salespeople 
to accede to their influence (e.g., Ouchi 1980). In contrast, external controls are 
nonobligatory influences from an outside source. Thus, the freedom to accede to the 
influence of external controls can give way to salespeople’s concerns about their 
appropriateness and legitimacy. An important implication of our research, therefore, is 
that firms should not expect internal and external controls to have identical influences.  
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Third, we provide evidence that the impact of controls at lower levels of analysis 
(e.g., salespeople) largely depends on the type of control at higher levels of analysis (e.g., 
sales managers). This is because salespeople look to their manager for cues to alleviate 
the tension they experience from external controls. Correspondingly, we find that similar 
manager external controls have a reinforcing effect on the salesperson’s external controls 
such that focused effort is enhanced. Notably, however, increasing sales manager external 
outcome control undermines the relationship between salesperson external behavior 
control and focused effort. This suggests that external rewards to another person (e.g., 
sales manager) can undermine one’s own (e.g., salesperson) intrinsic motivation. Thus, 
we provide a potential “cross-level” extension to cognitive evaluation theory, which 
suggests parallel effects at the within-level of analysis (Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999). 
Taken together, these findings begin to address calls from the literature to better 
understand how control systems interplay at different levels of analysis (e.g., Coughlan 
and Joseph 2012; Krafft et al. 2012; Miao and Evans 2013). 
2.5.2 Managerial Implications 
This research suggests that an outside firm (i.e., manufacturer) is capable of 
influencing the behaviors of another firm’s (i.e., distributor’s) employees at multiple 
levels of analysis. A key implication of our research is that the impact of salespeople’s 
external controls on their manufacturer-focused effort (the intended effect of investing in 
external controls), is largely contingent on the (dis)similarity of sales manager external 
controls. Thus, manufacturers should be cognizant of the interplay of external outcomes 
(e.g., financial incentives, recognition) and behavior controls (e.g., training) across 
distributor salespeople and their managers.  
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In particular, our results suggest that external outcome control directed at 
salespeople has little impact on their focused effort in and of itself; however, external 
outcome control directed at sales managers has a positive impact on their salespeople’s 
focused effort. Thus, it may behoove manufacturers to allocate financial incentives and 
recognition efforts to downstream sales managers rather than to salespeople. Doing so 
appears to have spillover effects on salespeople’s focused effort. If, however, 
manufacturers choose to provide external outcome control to downstream salespeople, 
they also need to provide substantial outcome control to sales managers. As our results 
suggest, not doing so can make the relationship between external outcome control 
directed at salespeople and their focused effort negative (i.e., the greater the SPIFs to 
salespeople, the lesser is their focused effort). Without external outcome control to their 
managers, salespeople have few cues to offset their concerns about the appropriateness of 
acting on these external influences. Moreover, salespeople may question the motives 
behind greater outcome control. Providing external outcome control to sales managers 
appears to alleviate these concerns. Indeed, our results suggest that when sales managers 
are provided with greater external outcome control, there is a positive relationship 
between external outcome control directed at salespeople and their focused effort. 
Somewhat surprisingly, our results also suggest that external behavior control 
directed at salespeople and their sales managers has little impact on focused effort alone. 
However, there is a positive relationship between salespeople’s external behavior control 
and their manufacturer-focused effort when their sales manager’s external behavior 
control is higher. This implies that training programs should be targeted to both 
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salespeople and sales managers, with an emphasis on sales managers learning how to 
coach their salespeople on selling the particular manufacturer’s products. 
In addition, the relationship between salesperson external behavior control and 
focused effort becomes less positive as sales manager external outcome control increases. 
Thus, manufacturers should be cognizant that extrinsic rewards provided to managers 
(e.g., SPIFs) may undermine salespeople’s intrinsic motivation normally associated with 
manufacturer training and coaching. 
2.6 Limitations and Further Research Directions 
This study has its strengths, but also has several limitations. Although we assessed 
salespeople’s focused effort from their managers, thereby minimizing social desirability 
and common method biases (e.g., Podsakoff and Organ 1986), this measure is perceptual 
nonetheless. Thus, further research should attempt to capture focused effort more 
objectively (e.g., number of manufacturer-specific sales calls). This study also focused on 
a single manufacturer within one business-to-business industry. Doing so allowed for a 
tight conceptualization and analysis of the impact of external controls but also reduces 
the generalizability of our results. Thus, further research might examine external controls 
across manufacturers and/or industries. Furthermore, the salespeople in this study were 
business-to-business account managers working for various office equipment distributors. 
External controls are certainly not exclusive to this context. As Table 2.1 suggests, 
external controls are prevalent in business-to-consumer settings as well (e.g., power tools 
and equipment, appliances, electronics). Thus, research should consider similarities and 
differences between business-to-business and business-to-consumer settings.  
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This research also assumes that salespeople are aware of their managers’ external 
outcome and behavior controls. This is likely to be the case for three reasons. First, prior 
research suggests that control systems elicit several signals and cues that others are likely 
able to discern (Cravens et al. 1993; Oliver and Anderson 1994). For example, 
salespeople can likely discern whether their manager is motivated by money or 
recognition (e.g., when observing a more aggressive selling style, with little consideration 
of customer needs). Second, salespeople are often aware of their manager’s external 
outcome control (e.g., SPIFs) because the forms to participate in a manufacturer’s reward 
program frequently ask whether a participant is a salesperson or sales manager. Third, 
manufacturer training and recognition is often conducted collectively with both 
salespeople and sales managers. Further research should, however, explore how explicit 
awareness of controls impacts the relationships presented here. 
This research sets the stage for several fruitful research avenues in the area of 
external controls. The focus of this research was on the implications of external controls 
for manufacturers. However, external controls are likely to have important implications 
for distributors as well. For example, when should distributors allow manufacturers to 
provide external controls to their salespeople and sales managers? On the one hand, a 
distributor may be hesitant to allow external controls because it does not want to 
relinquish control of salesperson behavior (see Appendix A1.4 for a popular press article 
regarding this loss of control). Moreover, distributors may fear that sales force partiality 
toward one manufacturer might result in subpar customer solutions, lost profit, and 
alienation of their other upstream manufacturer partners. On the other hand, distributors 
can benefit from manufacturers’ use of external controls because they provide 
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supplemental income and training to their employees, which may boost satisfaction and 
reduce turnover. Indeed, many hiring firms highlight the earning potential of SPIFs in job 
descriptions (Appendix A1.5). Thus, further research could address the trade-offs 
distributors face when considering whether or not to allow external controls.  
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, customers are largely unaware of the use of 
external controls in both business-to-business and business-to-consumer contexts. While 
customers have a general sense that salespeople may have ulterior motives behind their 
recommendations, the source of the controls and the extent to which they are pursued by 
salespeople are typically unknown. Customers could uncover potential biases from their 
salespeople by inquiring into the amount of a salesperson’s SPIF, with the hope of 
preventing salespeople from making improper product recommendations. Thus, further 
research could explore how customer awareness of external controls affects their 




2.7 Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1: Manufacturers’ Use of Outcome Control 
(i.e., financial reward or SPIFs) 
Company Product Incentive 
2/90 Sign Systems Signage $1 per unit (select models) 
3M Cleaning products $50–$300 based on level of sales 
AllSeating Contract furniture $1–$20 per unit  
Amana HVAC $25–$75 per unit 
Bio Ionic Salon products $25 per 2 units sold 
Boost Mobile Mobile phones $55 per unit 
Delsey Luggage Luggage $2–$8 per unit 
Embassy House Cabinetry $10 per cabinet 
EWS  Water systems $75 per unit 
GMC Automotive accessories $25  
GMI Electronics 5% of net sale 
Grasshopper Farm equipment $60–$200 per unit 
Great Openings Contract furniture $5–$10 per unit (select models) 
GWD & Trane Heating & cooling $25–$175 per unit (select units) 
Harter Contract furniture 3% of net sales 
Homer Laughlin Co. China $2–$10 per dozen dishes 
Husqvarna Outdoor power equipment $10–$15 per unit (select models) 
Indiana Furniture Contract furniture 3% net sales 
John Deere Outdoor power equipment $5–$90 per unit 
JVC Electronics $50–$300 per unit 
Kawai Pianos $25–$500 per piano 
Kawasaki Engines & power products $10 per unit (select models) 
La-Z-Boy Contract furniture $10 per unit 
LG Electronics $10 per unit (select models) 
PIDA Pet products  $10 per unit & gift cards 
Pioneer Electronics $150–$500 
Silestone Sen Kitchen countertops $25–$75 per unit 
Sony Electronics $50–$650 per unit 
Southern Ice Ice machines $40 per unit 
Swan Granite $10 per unit 
Telus Internet Program points & $5–$10 per unit 
Watermark Faucets & trim $10 per unit (select models) 
Wilson Jones: Madeli Home vanities/countertops $5–$20 per unit  
Workrite Contract furniture Up to 7% net (select models) 




Table 2.2: Controls Research Organized by Source and Level* 
Source 





Governance of individuals within a 
hierarchical level within the firm through
the use of outcome and behavior controls 
Anderson and Oliver (1987); Agarwal (1996); 
Basu et al. (1985); Celly and Frazier (1996); 
Challagalla and Shervani (1996); Cravens et al.
(1993); Eisenhardt (1985; 1988); Jaworski 
(1988); Jaworski and MacInnis (1989); Joseph
and Thevaranjan (1998); Kirsch (1997); Krafft 
et al. (2012); Miao, Evans, and Zou (2006); 
Oliver and Anderson (1994); Ouchi and
Maguire (1975); Ramaswami (1996)  
Governance of individuals within a
hierarchical level in another firm through
the use of outcome and behavior controls 
Caldieraro and Coughlan (2007); Coughlan
and Joseph (2012); Gilliland (2004) 





Governance of individuals across 
hierarchical levels within the firm through
the use of outcome and behavior controls 
Research gap 
Governance of individuals across 
hierarchical levels in another firm through
the use of outcome and behavior controls 
Research gap 






















● ● ● 
Models the optimal product to SPIF within a
manufacturer’s product line, given either monopolistic
or competitive environments.  
Coughlan and 
Joseph (2012) 
● ● ● 
Identifies SPIFs as a method used by manufacturers to 
motivate downstream multi-manufacturer distributor 
salespeople to expend more effort on their particular 
products. 
Gilliland (2004) ● ● ● 
Identifies market development support from 
manufacturers, including joint sales calls and product
demonstrations, as methods to motivate downstream 
partners. 
Current study ● ● ● ● 
Empirically examines both external outcome and 
external behavior controls across levels of analysis to 
suggest that the impact of salespeople’s external
controls on their manufacturer-focused effort is largely 
contingent on their sales manager’s external controls. 




**p < .01, *p < .05. 
Notes: S = salesperson; M = sales manager; = Cronbach’s alpha index of internal
consistency, = composite reliability index, AVE = average variance extracted,  
a= single-item measure. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. External outcome control (S) 1.00 
2. External behavior control (S) .52** 1.00 
3. External outcome control (M) .12 .14* 1.00 
4. External behavior control (M) .09 .27** .45** 1.00 
5. Focused effort -.06 .08 .30** .15* 1.00 
6. Focused performance .00 -.01 .00 .03 .13 1.00 
7. Manufacturer reputation .27** .28** .14* -.04 .15* -.01 1.00 
8. Number of manufacturers .08 .02 -.06 -.05 -.06 -.02 .01 1.00 
9. Salesperson experience  -.09 -.09 .09 -.02 .04 .04 .13 -.12 1.00 
10. Internal outcome control (S) .12 .21** .03 -.04 .01 -.03 .28** -.18** -.05 1.00 
11. Internal behavior control (S) .08 .13 -.03 -.09 -.08 .00 .23** -.02 -.12 .40** 1.00 
M 3.65 3.26 3.20 3.33 3.55 .75 3.98 4.31 15.11 3.68 3.80 
SD .75 .93 .82 .87 .79 2.34 .64 7.32 10.45 .85 .78 
α .79 .93 .80 .94 .89  --a .89 --a --a .77 .93 
ρ .83 .94 .84 .95 .90  --a .92 --a --a .79 .94 
AVE .62 .75 .63 .78 .75  --a .78 --a --a .56 .76 
Table 2.4: Construct Reliabilities and Correlations 
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Table 2.5: Model Results 
*** p ≤ .001, **p ≤ .01, *p ≤ .05, n = 201. 
  
Path from Path to H0 
H0 
Sign 
Model 1 Model 2  
Salesperson external outcome control (SEO) Focused 
Effort 
  -.54 .03 
Salesperson external behavior control (SEB)   .25 .09 
      
Moderators      
Manager external outcome control (MEO) Focused 
Effort 
  - .29*** 
Manager external behavior control (MEB)   - -.01 
      
Interactions      
SEO × MEO 
Focused 
Effort 
H1 + - .07
* 
SEB × MEB H2 + - .03
** 
SEO × MEB H3 + - -.01 
SEB × MEO H4 - - -.04
* 
      
Covariates      




  -.01 -.01 
Manufacturer reputation   .17* .13 
Number of manufacturers   -.03** -.02** 
Salesperson experience   -.03* -.03 
Salesperson internal outcome control   .02 .02 
Salesperson internal behavior control   -.12*** -.11** 
      
Addressing Endogeneity      
?̂?1    .31 -0.30 
(?̂? × Z)1    .01 -0.16 
?̂?2    -.21 -0.07* 
(?̂? × Z)2    -.00 -0.00 
      




Log-likelihood    -881.46 -868.22 
Free parameters (d.f.)    29 45 





Figure 2.1: Conceptual Model 
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Figure 2.2: Contingency Effects 
Sales Manager External Control 
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Dissimilar Controls Similar Controls 
(Salesperson Behavior Control (Salesperson Behavior Control 
× × 
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3  An Inductively-Generated Recommendation Process Model of Salespeople 
3.1 Introduction 
Imagine that Lucy, a thirty-something working professional, mother, and wife, walks into 
a home improvement retailer. She heads to the appliance department to inquire about a 
new range. After a brief exchange, the salesperson makes a recommendation, and she 
thanks him for his time. An hour later, Lucy walks into a different location of the same 
home improvement retailer. Again, she heads to the appliance department to inquire 
about a new range. After a brief exchange, the salesperson makes a different 
recommendation, and she thanks her for her time.  
When we repeated such a scenario 71 times across three large home improvement 
retailers, we received 31 different product recommendations. Moreover, we encountered 
very different salesperson recommendation processes even within the same retailer. What 
these findings suggest is that a customer, whose needs stay the same, may very well be 
recommended different products depending upon which salesperson they happen to talk 
to. Why do different salespeople recommend different products to customers with the 
same needs? Why do salespeople differ in their sales recommendation processes despite 
(presumably) similar training? These questions remain largely unanswered to date, which 
is surprising given the important implications which can arise from providing such 
conflicting advice to customers. The purpose of this research, therefore, is to begin to 
address these questions and, in doing so, shed light on a salesperson’s underlying 
recommendation process that customers can take into consideration when making a 
purchasing decision. 
Customers frequently rely on the advice or recommendations of salespeople for 
several reasons. For example, salespeople are often privy to information that is not 
readily available to customers (e.g., product return statistics). Additionally, customers 
57 
 
may lack the time or knowledge to make the decision for themselves (Stone and Allgaier 
2008). When customers rely on salespeople for advice and recommendations, they shift a 
portion of their decision-making responsibility to the salesperson (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, 
Frey 2005). Thus, the decision shifts from self decision-making (i.e., making a decision 
for oneself) to self-other decision-making (making a decision for someone else) (Polman 
2010). 
Despite an extensive literature on self decision-making (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and 
Payne 1998), there is much less research on self-other decision-making. Whereas self-
other research is beginning to emerge across disciplines (e.g., Beisswanger et al. 2003; 
Polman 2010; 2012; Wray and Stone 2005), it tends to focus on contextual differences 
between self and self-other decision-making (Beisswanger et al. 2003; Wray and Stone 
2005). For example, previous research compares self and self-other decision-making in 
terms of the amount of information sources consulted (Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, and Frey 
2005), the indulgence of choices (Laran 2010), and the risk aversion of choice 
(Beisswanger et al. 2003). Importantly, although the literature suggests that self and self-
other decision-making are made via different processes, prior research has yet to explore 
these differences (Lu, Xie, and Xu 2012; Wray and Stone 2005). 
In doing this research, we make three key contributions to the literature. First, to 
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to forward a process model of 
recommendations (self-other decision-making). This process model includes goals, 
strategies, and recommendations, and reflects the integration of a primary field study with 
the decision-making literature. The model complements and extends prior research on the 
self decision-making process in several ways. For instance, unlike the self decision-
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making process which tends to emphasize maximizing accuracy or minimizing effort 
goals, the self-other decision-making process emphasizes different goals (i.e., minimizing 
negative emotions and maximizing ease of justifying a product). In addition, although we 
observed fewer self-other decision-making strategies than those advanced in the self 
decision-making literature, we distilled new strategies of self-other decision-making (e.g., 
product homogenization, self-other lexicographic). 
Second, we contribute to the literature by highlighting the observable signals that 
salespeople provide for their unobservable recommendation goals and strategies. 
Drawing upon communication theory (e.g., Mohr and Nevin 1990) and our field research, 
we identify six facets of communication that signal the presence or absence of 
salespeople’s goals (e.g., directionality, tone). In addition, our research surfaced several 
recommendation justifications that signal underlying information processing strategies. 
Thus, unlike prior research on self decision-making which infers goals from strategies 
(e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998), our research provides evidence of novel signals 
for underlying recommendation goals and strategies. 
Third, we provide an integrated framework of the recommendation process via a 
set of propositions which link the steps in the process. Doing so provides customers with 
a “roadmap” of how salespeople may come to recommend the products they do, such that 
customers can then determine the extent to which they integrate the recommendation into 
their own decision-making. Thus, we address calls from the literature to provide research 
which serves to better educate customers on how to make good purchasing decisions 
when incorporating other’s advice (e.g., Bazerman 2001). 
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The insights we provide in this research are based on a grounded theory approach 
(e.g, Glaser and Straus 1967; Spiggle 1994; Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1990). In 
particular, we covertly audio-recorded 71 sales encounters with retail salespeople in their 
natural setting (i.e., retail stores). Such an approach allows the salesperson-customer 
experience to unfold naturally (Belk, Sherry, and Wallendorf 1988), which affords a 
richer knowledge of the topic area and data that is not contrived (Wilson 2001). 
Moreover, this approach lends credibility to our findings by producing unfiltered, 
naturalistic data, which does not suffer from informants’ limited memory recall (Finn 
2001), discrepancies between reported and actual behavior, and a variety of desirability 
biases that may occur with surveys, off-site interviews, and focus groups (Friedrichs and 
Ludtke 1975). 
3.2  Background 
 The emerging self-other decision-making literature falls within the greater context 
of decision-making, which to date has emphasized why and how a decision is made for 
oneself (e.g., customers or salespeople deciding which product to purchase for 
themselves) (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; 
Yates 1990). Decision-making is understood to be an adaptive and constructive process, 
even when facing familiar choices (Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 1993). Research in this 
area has explored the process by which customers make decisions (e.g., Bettman, Luce, 
and Payne 1998), the factors that influence the process (e.g., Pham 1998), and outcomes 
of the process (e.g., Greenleaf and Lehmann 1995; Tsiros and Mittal 2000). 
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 Surprisingly, sparse attention has been given to the complementary stream of self-
other decision-making, in which decisions are made for others (e.g., a salesperson 
deciding which product to recommend to a customer). The literature identifies two types 
of self-other decision-makers: advisors, who make a recommendation while the ultimate 
choice is left to the customer (e.g., a salesperson recommending a product) and proxy 
decision-makers, who make a choice on behalf of someone else without their final 
consent (e.g., a politician voting or doctor treating an unconscious patient) (e.g., Lu, Xie, 
and Xu 2012; Polman 2012). The present research focuses on self-other decision-makers 
in the ‘advisor’ role, as it is far more relevant to the role and duties of salespeople. 
 Research suggests that self-other decision-makers make different choices than self 
decision-makers (e.g., Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey 2005; Lu, 
Xie, and Xu 2012). For example, previous research has drawn upon regulatory focus 
theory (Polman 2012) and construal level theory (Lu, Xie, and Xu 2012) to suggest that, 
compared to making decisions for themselves, self-other decision-makers tend to consult 
more information sources (Polman 2010; Jonas and Frey 2003), make more indulgent 
choices (Laran 2010), have greater predecisional distortion (Polman 2010), experience 
different levels of emotion (Beisswanger et al. 2003; Kray 2000), and may make riskier 
choices (Stone and Allgaier 2008). 
 Thus, although prior research suggests a self decision-making process (Bettman, 
Luce, and Payne 1998) and compares aspects of the choices made in a self decision-
making context to the recommendations made in a self-other decision-making context, to 
the best of our knowledge no research has attempted to establish nor illuminate the 
distinctive process by which self-other decisions are made. We begin to address this void 
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by drawing upon field data as well as literature from marketing, communication, 
psychology, and economics to generate a model of the self-other (recommendation) 
decision-making process.  
3.3  Method 
In order to gain initial insights into salesperson recommendation behaviors, the 
authors conducted an extensive, inductive qualitative study via covert participant 
observation (see Appendix A2.1 for IRB approval). Participant observation affords 
researchers the opportunity to observe and understand salesperson behaviors in their 
natural environment, from which themes, patterns, and anomalies emerge (e.g., Arnould 
and Price 1993; Bernthal, Crockett, and Rose 2005; Canniford and Shankar 2013; Celsi, 
Rose, and Leigh 1993; Coulter, Price, and Feick 2003; Peñaloza 1994; Schouten and 
McAlexander 1995; Tumbat and Belk 2011). Participation observation at the interaction 
site of interest (e.g., retailer) also allows the experience to unfold naturally (Belk, Sherry, 
and Wallendorf 1988), which allows researchers to develop a richer knowledge of the 
topic area and produces data that is not contrived (Wilson 2001). Furthermore, the data 
does not suffer from informants’ limited memory recall (Finn 2001), discrepancies 
between reported and actual behavior, and a variety of desirability biases that may occur 
with retrospective surveys, off-site interviews, and focus groups (Friedrichs and Ludtke 
1975). The first author conducted all participant observations. The second author was 
purposely excluded from the data collection to ensure independent cross-validation and 
reality-checking (Celsi, Rose, and Leigh 1993). 
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For this study, the first author went undercover to assume the role of a customer 
and engaged in 76 selling encounters with actual salespeople from three large retailers. A 
similar form of information gathering known as mystery shopping occurs regularly in 
practice as a means to assess service quality and employee performance (Wilson 2001). 
Mystery shopping is an emerging and valuable method of data collection in the marketing 
academic literature (e.g., Ainscough and Motley 2000; Bone, Christensen, and Williams 
2014; Fin 2001) because it lends credibility to the findings by producing unfiltered, 
naturalistic data. Furthermore, mystery shopping in the actual retail location allows the 
researcher to capture evidence that would likely not be accessible via other 
methodologies (e.g., product counts, product availability by manufacturer, and 
conversation duration times). However, unlike previous research following this method, 
we audio-recorded the encounters to allow for in-depth analysis of the content and 
structure of the conversations. 
3.3.1  Role of the Authors  
The authors’ preconceived perceptions of salesperson recommendation behavior 
may influence this work in several ways. Most importantly, both authors are typical 
customers involved in transactions with salespeople on a regular basis. In addition, both 
have at least five years of experience in corporate sales with different multi-line 
dealerships. In those positions, they were given full discretion over which particular 
manufacturers’ products to recommend to clients, and are aware of several factors that 
influenced those decisions (e.g., fulfilment of personal financial goals). While all efforts 
are made to ensure objectivity, it is possible that some of the findings of this research are 
unconsciously influenced by the authors’ knowledge and experience with the customer-
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salesperson relationship from both perspectives. However, these experiences also lend 
credibility to the findings by providing the authors with a broader understanding of the 
topic area. Furthermore, this study makes use of audio-recording and transcription to 
limit the authors’ undue influence on data. 
3.3.2  Sample  
Participants were recruited for this study via purposive sampling, which involves 
selecting participants according to the specific needs and criteria of the study (Berg 2009; 
Lincoln and Guba 1985; Miles and Huberman 1994). The key criterion for inclusion in 
this study is that the individual was an appliance salesperson at one of the three selected 
large retailers. Each salesperson was individually approached by the first author. In no 
instances did multiple salespeople approach the author, such that one had to be randomly 
selected. Of the 76 sales encounters, one salesperson did not provide consent to 
participate in the study, and four salespeople were unavailable to provide consent due to 
termination of employment and retirement prior to the debriefing date. This resulted in a 
final sample size of 71, with no individual store location or salesperson being included 
more than once.  
Descriptive demographic information for each salesperson was recorded in the 
Encounter Log (Table 3.1), including their approximate age (under 30, 30-60, or over 
60), gender, and ethnicity (White, African American, Hispanic, Asian) based on the first 
author’s observation (Bernthal, Crockett, and Rose 2005; Bradford 2015; Canniford and 
Shankar 2013; Peñaloza 1994; Tumbat and Belk 2011). The sample consisted of 67% 
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males and 33% females, of which 15% were under 30 years old, 68% were 30-60 years 
old, and 17% were over 60 years old. 
3.3.3  Procedure 
This study involved deception (Christensen 1988) such that the retail salespeople 
believed that they were selling to a real potential customer. The sales encounters occurred 
over a one month period during the summer of 2013. The encounters took place across 
four states and included a total of 2,116 miles driven. Three large national retail chains 
were selected rather than small stores to allow for additional comparison of processes 
within one chain of stores – a distinction that would not be possible in stores with few 
locations (i.e., local appliance stores). The three retail chains were selected because they 
are of similar size, similar organizational structure, and offer the same manufacturers’ 
products. All sales encounters occurred between the hours of 6:45am and 8:30pm on 
Tuesdays during non-holiday times to avoid the high-traffic weekend periods and the risk 
of sales efforts being dependent on promotional holiday pricing. 
The first author entered each store wearing black shorts, an unmarked white t-
shirt, white socks, gray tennis shoes, and a neon pink hat. Aside from the hat, the clothing 
was intended to be basic and neutral as to minimize stereotyping that could be elicited by 
branded clothing. She carried her keys, wallet, and a folded piece of notebook paper that 
had the appearance of a short shopping list containing the following items: 
“brush/rollers”, “light bulb for front porch”, and “stove?” (Figure 3.2). Upon entering the 
appliance department in each retailer (see Figure 3.3 for a typical appliance department 
layout), she purposefully stood in a ‘neutral’ location at the end of a row of electric 
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ranges so as to not appear to have already considered a particular model or be more 
interested in a particular model than others. When approached, she expressed to the 
salesperson that she and her husband were planning to purchase a range the following 
weekend, but had jointly decided that she would come in to meet with a salesperson 
beforehand3. 
Throughout the encounters, she responded to questions as asked and maintained 
the same set of responses via a predetermined set of question responses (Table 3.2). The 
predetermined responses were developed by pretesting them with three local retailers 
prior to the formal study to determine commonly-asked questions, and to ensure that 
every salesperson had information available to them to recommend an array of ranges. 
The predetermined set of responses was iteratively refined for accuracy and relevance to 
a natural sales encounter (Peñaloza 1994), and included responses for questions like the 
budget, the metal finish, and the amount of cooking done on a weekly basis. If an 
additional question arose during an encounter that did not have a predetermined response, 
the author answered the question honestly as she would in real life and maintained that 
same response if the question arose in another encounter. This ensured a programmatic 
and systematic approach to the encounters, and maximized the reliability of findings 
(Wilson 2001). She had a short interview guide (Appendix A2.2) (Coulter, Price, and 
Feick 2003) memorized with general questions that allowed her to ensure that each 
salesperson was given the opportunity to make a recommendation. She then allowed the 
sales encounter to unfold naturally. The author did not proactively provide her needs or 
                                                          
3 A stipulation of IRB approval required that the author inform salespeople upfront that she would not be 
making a purchase that particular day so that they were not left with disappointment or concerns over their 
selling abilities when she indeed did not make a purchase. 
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preferences in any encounter, but reactively responded to every question using the 
response guide. Oftentimes, after a recommendation was provided, the salesperson 
offered a printout with the product information. If that did not occur, the author took a 
photograph on her cell phone (e.g., Schouten and McAlexander 1995) or wrote down the 
model number on her shopping list in order to verify final recommendations and later 
align them with objective rankings. At the end of each encounter, the author thanked the 
salesperson for their help and left the store without making a purchase. No purchase of 
any kind was made at any store across the 71 encounters. At some point during each sales 
encounter (typically before being approached by a salesperson), the author recorded the 
number of electric ranges on the floor that fell within a predetermined set of product 
responses (i.e., parameters; for example, $1000 budget, electric, stainless finish). This 
was to ensure that all salespeople were able to proceed through a recommendation 
process to choose a product to propose rather than having to recommend a particular 
product only because no other options were available. Indeed, in all encounters the 
number of products available on the floor within the set of parameters ranged from 6 to 
21, with an average of 13.  
The process of debriefing informants coincided with their right to confidentiality. 
The salesperson’s first name was written down as a part of the Encounter Log (Table 
3.1). Within two weeks of each sales encounter, the first author called the store’s main 
phone number and asked to speak with that particular salesperson in the appliance 
department. This process ensured that she did not need to record or safeguard their full 
name or email address (which typically includes a full name). If the salesperson was not 
working, she attempted to contact them on a weekly basis. The Encounter Log was 
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updated regularly with the date of debrief call attempts, the date the debriefing actually 
occurred, and the salesperson’s response to the debriefing. Once on the phone, she 
explained to them that she was recently in the store and had on a neon pink hat, which 
was a memorable, yet realistic item that served to help the salesperson recall the specific 
encounter. The author then debriefed the salesperson by following a prepared script 
(Appendix A2.3). As requested by IRB, all debriefing-related information was deleted 
from the files after consent was obtained or denied to protect the informants’ anonymity.  
3.3.4 Special Considerations  
Special considerations were made throughout the entire data collection procedure 
to minimize risk or harm to the informants, retailers, product manufacturers, and author, 
as well as to ensure a systematic, scientific procedure. In safeguarding the salespeople, 
any potential loss of income as a result of participation in the study was mitigated by 
ensuring that the three large retail chains offer compensation plans based on salary rather 
than commission. This was verified by at least one salesperson from each of the three 
retail chains. Additionally, the author waited to enter the appliance area until it was clear 
of all other customers, and (although it never happened) was prepared to excuse herself 
immediately if another customer entered the area, such that any loss of potential store 
profits were mitigated. This meant that the store did not lose overall sales by having 
salespeople talk to the author rather than selling to other customers. No manufacturer 
documentation was accepted (e.g., manufacturer brochures, pamphlets, flyers) to mitigate 
the cost of this study to the manufacturers.  
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To enhance the validity of this study, an electric range4 was chosen as the product 
of interest because it is a realistic item that a thirty-something married female would 
purchase. Furthermore, because appliances are involved, non-regular purchases, 
salespeople are oftentimes consulted before a customer choice is made. The stores were 
not informed of this study to mitigate the likelihood of management tipping off 
employees that the research may occur in their department, which would invalidate the 
data. Furthermore, store management may have steered the author towards, or only 
allowed access to, a particular set of stores to study (e.g., high-performing stores or low-
performing stores), which would provide a biased sample of salespeople and stores. 
3.3.5 Data  
Within five minutes of each encounter’s completion, the Encounter Log (Table 
3.1) was updated and field notes were made by the first author. The field notes and sales 
encounters were audio recorded (Bradford 2015; Canniford and Shankar 2013; Schouten 
and McAlexander 1995). Audio recording, followed immediately by transcription, is the 
most thorough and complete form of field notes, and is in line with the verbatim 
principle, such that the researcher “must make a verbatim record of what people say” 
(Spradley 1979, p. 73). Audio recording ensures that the data is not filtered or translated 
through the researcher’s perceptions of what is occurring, but rather is verbatim from the 
salesperson. Missing out on key details captured in the informant’s wording can cause a 
loss of key data from the study. Recording conversations without dual consent is a legal 
                                                          
4 The term ‘range’ is often used interchangeably with the terms ‘oven’ or ‘stove’. All three retailers in this 
study, as well as Consumer Reports, refer to a cooking appliance which encompasses both an oven and a 
stovetop as a ‘range’. Thus, we refer to it here as a ‘range’.  
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practice in all four states where the study was conducted. The audio recording device 
used to record the conversations was an 8GB USB Pen Drive Digital Audio Voice 
Recorder, which was attached to the author’s keychain during the time of the study 
(Figure 3.2). This device recorded at a speed of 128bps, capturing 898 total minutes 
(roughly 15 hours) of recorded data including both encounters and field notes. Each 
encounter was recorded as a .wav file, and was downloaded onto a computer via the 
integrated USB drive to allow for transcription via a third-party transcription service. The 
author’s field notes were a separate recording which served to capture immediate 
thoughts and reactions immediately following each encounter (Canniford and Shankar 
2013; Peñaloza 1994; Tumbat and Belk 2011). The first author also noted the date, time, 
recommendation, number of available models on the floor, and any additional details 
specific to that encounter that could be used to verify the transcriptions. The author’s 
audio-recorded field notes were transcribed as described above.  
3.3.6 Analysis  
We independently read the entire set of transcripts to get a general sense for the 
nature of the encounters (Spiggle 1994). Over numerous meetings, we discussed 
emerging themes and patterns across the 71 encounters, and debated their distinctiveness 
and relevance to the topic (Canniford and Shankar 2013; Celsi, Rose, and Leigh 1993; 
Schouten and McAlexander 1995). As recommended by Spiggle (1994), we documented 
these discussions in an ongoing set of notes that both authors edited and contributed to. 
An initial, overarching recommendation process emerged which consisted of six large 
categories. Similar to Bone, Christensen, and Williams (2014), Holt (1995), and 
McQuarrie, Miller, and Phillips (2013), we used the iterative, constant comparison 
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procedure to contrast and differentiate the categories, as well as compare them to existing 
literature across disciplines (Glaser 1956). As a result of this procedure, the original six 
categories were collapsed into a three-step process model consisting of goals, strategies, 
and recommendations. We refined the dimensions of each step (i.e., the five different 
strategies within the strategy step) through reference to literature and our field study (e.g., 
Schilpzand, Hekman, and Mitchell 2014). Throughout this analysis, the identification of 
steps and dimensions within the encounters were organized using QSR International’s 
NVivo 10 coding software. We met regularly to resolve any discrepancies via discussion, 
and to confer that all findings were grounded in the data (Bone, Christensen, and 
Williams 2014; Peñaloza 1994).  
3.4  Recommendation Process Model 
From our field study, a three-step process emerged by which salespeople make 
recommendations to customers (Figure 3.4). This recommendation process consists of (1) 
goals, (2) strategies, and (3) recommendations, with several dimensions within each step 
(e.g., four observed goals within the first step). In the following sections, we draw upon 
observations from the sales encounters and previous research to define and examine these 
steps, as well as construct propositions which integrate the recommendation process 
model.  
3.4.1 Goals 
Goals reflect the motivations driving a salesperson’s recommendation (e.g., 
Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998; Luce 1998). Previous research suggest that goals stem 
from various characteristics of the decision context, such as the timeline, availability of 
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feedback regarding the decision, and environment (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Our 
study suggests that salespeople are motivated by goals similar to those of individuals 
making decisions for themselves. However, as we will note, the prevalence with which 
each type of goal is pursued varies significantly between self and self-other decision-
makers. Salesperson recommendation goals are: to maximize the accuracy of their 
recommendation, to minimize their effort in providing a recommendation, to minimize 
negative emotions they experience when providing a recommendation, and to maximize 
the ease of justifying their recommendation to the customer. These goals are not mutually 
exclusive and can occur simultaneously in varying degrees. Furthermore, goals are often 
constructed on-the-spot and fluctuate throughout a single sales encounter (Bettman, Luce, 
and Payne 1998; Dhar and Gorlin 2013; Payne, Bettman, Johnson 1993; Slovic 1995) as 
well as across multiple customers (e.g., Dhar and Novemsky 2008). Thus, a salesperson 
may be driven by one goal with their first customer of the day and a different goal with 
another customer. 
The goals motivating a salesperson’s recommendation are difficult to measure 
because they are internal and fluctuate (Bettman Luce, and Payne 1998). Therefore, we 
draw upon communication theory (Krone, Jablin, and Putnam 1987), as well as the 
channel communication literature (e.g., Gross, 1968; Mohr and Nevin 1990), to identify 
communication facets that may serve as signals for a salesperson’s goals. Communication 
facets have been shown to underlie coordination and satisfaction within channel 
relationships (Mohr and Nevin 1990). We identify four facets which describe both the 
content and structure of these encounters: duration (i.e., length of the conversation 
measured in minutes), directionality as either unilateral (i.e., conversation dominated by 
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the salesperson) or bidirectional (i.e., conversation more evenly divided between the 
salesperson and the customer), tone as either formal (i.e., strictly professional and sale-
related) or informal (i.e., personal questions and colloquial discussion), and focus on 
either features of the product itself (i.e., price) (Gross 1968) or evaluations of the product 
which could be gathered from a variety of sources (i.e., reference to ratings, reviews, 
other customers, previous sales). We observed two additional facets in the study: 
objectivity as either subjective (i.e., interjection of the salesperson’s personal opinion) or 
objective (i.e., reliance on facts with no personal opinion) and feature-need linkage 
(whether or not the salesperson discusses features in terms of customer needs). We now 
discuss each of the recommendation goals through the communication facets framework 
(Table 3.3). 
3.4.1.1 Maximizing Accuracy  
We define the goal to maximize accuracy as the extent to which a salesperson is 
motivated to seek the best product for a customer based on their unique needs and 
preferences (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). By best product, we are referring to 
the available product with the closest fit to customer needs. Past self-other decision-
making research suggests that the amount and type of information discussed during a 
conversation results in a better understanding of the other’s preferences (Jonas, Schulz-
Hardt, and Frey 2005). Longer, bilateral encounters allow the salesperson to ask 
questions and listen for customer responses, which increases the amount and types of 
information received by the salesperson5. Not surprisingly, therefore, our findings 
                                                          
5 Consistent with the consideration set literature, it is typical for a customer to initially remove irrelevant 
products from their list of potential alternatives before beginning the actual decision-making process (e.g., 
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suggest that accuracy-driven encounters to be relatively longer and bidirectional. As the 
following illustrates, the nature of the conversation also tends to be more informal:  
Salesperson: Is it just you and the husband or is there a family…? 
Customer: I have a baby. 
Salesperson: How fabulous! 
Customer: She’s 10 months old so I have some fun. 
Salesperson: My kids are 36 and 33 and I still -- my grandkids they 
are 10 and 6. I absolutely adore being in the kitchen. My six-year 
old grandson can make as good an apple pie as I can. He started 
little, like when she’s -- little baby rolling and stuff and it just 
becomes first nature to them and they love it. Instead of sitting and 
watching TV whenever they come to my house, you can see in their 
faces, “Can we go bake? Let’s go bake lady cakes…” So at 10 
months she’s ready to handle one and put that little roller in her 
hands and working with it and stuff and you’ll go enjoy working 
with her later on in the kitchen. So convection is -- if that one had 
not had convection on it, I would step over and say take a look at 
convection, just in case you really are a homemaker or a baker.  
This informal small-talk helps put the customer at ease, which builds rapport 
between the customer and salesperson. As the customer becomes more at ease, they are 
more honest, open, and forthcoming with information (Taylor and Bogdan 1984). The 
salesperson is able to uncover customer needs and preferences which were not explicitly 
requested, such as the customer’s growing family in the example above. This particular 
salesperson used the information about the customer’s family to not only recommend a 
product with convection baking because baking can be a fun family activity, but also to 
recommend a product with a large capacity to accommodate more dishes at one time. In 
                                                          
Alba and Chattopadhyay 1985; Howard and Sheth 1969). For example, when purchasing a vehicle, the 
customer may eliminate vans and trucks before deciding among all available cars. In concert with this 
notion, it is typical that a salesperson ask the customer an initial set of ‘qualifier’ questions to identify the 
relevant product category. In the present study, the qualifier question typically referred to a focus on gas or 
electric ranges. This initial question did not signal the identification of a customer’s unique needs and 
preferences within the product cateogry, but served to determine which (large) set of products were 
relevant to the conversation. Assessing customer needs beyond this initial ‘qualifier’ questions constitute 
the make-up of facets coded in this study. 
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another encounter, the salesperson casually asked about the customer’s and her spouse's 
job while searching products online, which sparked the salesperson to show a product 
that preheated quickly for families in need of a shorter cooking time.  
Previous research suggests that self-other decision-makers tend to seek 
information from more sources than self decision-makers (Jonas and Frey 2003; Polman 
2010). Thus, a recommendation accuracy goal drives salespeople to present information 
based on both features (e.g., attributes of the products, pricing information, available 
promotions) and evaluations (e.g., ratings, performance reviews, past sales history). The 
following example demonstrates a salesperson’s use of both feature-based information 
(i.e., burner size and heating element) and evaluation-based information (i.e., 
performance reviews) during their presentation of product information: 
Salesperson: (Manufacturer) makes wonderful stoves. This 
particular unit gets a lot of good reviews. One of the more basic 
features in terms of use is to get two different burner sizes is here. 
You have the hidden elements here. So, there are no coils on the 
bottom for things to fall down onto and to solidify. I think there is 
also the steam clean model if I'm not mistaken. 
Additionally, Jonas and Frey (2003) suggest that, unlike self decision-makers, 
self-other decision-makers do not favor information that only confirms their 
recommendation. Rather, salespeople pursuing an accuracy goal provide balanced 
information (i.e., for and against a product), which ensures the customer is fully-informed 
for their final purchase decision, and signals that the salesperson is putting in the time to 
consider the strengths and weaknesses of each product. This is demonstrated in the 
following encounter, as a salesperson presents the positives and negatives of a product: 
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Salesperson: This model has the steam clean. So, it makes the clean-
up easier. But the drawback is, that you allow yourself for a little bit 
more time for heating up. 
As products are being presented and demonstrated, a goal to maximize accuracy 
drives a salesperson to present information about products by linking features and 
information with the needs of the customer. Furthermore, while linking to customer 
needs, it is unlikely that the salesperson emphasizes his personal opinions. In the 
following conversation, a salesperson demonstrates these two communication facets by 
directly linking his discussion of convection fans to the customer’s response regarding 
her oven use, without explicitly interjecting any of his own personal preferences towards 
convection fans:  
Salesperson:  So, what kind of cook are you?  Do you guys typically 
use the oven a lot for a lot of things? 
Customer:  I use it four nights a week for dinner and I bake maybe 
once a month. 
Salesperson:  You do a lot of cooking in the oven. Let’s switch over 
here because I think that you could actually use a convection. It may 
be something that you're not used to, but it’s one of the things that 
you will start to develop and may really like. 
Based on the preceding arguments, we suggest the following proposition: 
 P1:  A recommendation goal to maximize accuracy is signaled 
   by communication with (a) longer duration, (b) bilateral 
   conversation, (c) an informal tone, (d) a focus on feature- 
   and evaluation-based information, (e) objectivity from the 
   salesperson, (f) and an emphasis on feature-need linkage. 
3.4.1.2 Minimizing Effort  
We define the goal to minimize effort as the extent to which a salesperson is 
motivated to reduce the time and energy expended towards seeking the best product for a 
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customer (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Prior research suggests that certain 
communication facets result in commitment within the channel, where commitment 
refers, in part, to the extent to which one channel member (i.e., salesperson) is willing to 
exert effort on behalf of another channel member (i.e., customer) (Mohr and Nevins 
1990). Thus, the presence or absence of particular communication facets serves as a 
signal of a salesperson who is minimizing his effort.
Mohr and Nevins (1990) suggest that conversation duration is a component of 
effort, such that minimizing recommendation effort manifests itself in short conversations 
that are largely unilateral (i.e., salesperson-dominant). When a conversation is kept short, 
the salesperson does not take time to engage the customer or incorporate their feedback. 
The salesperson in the following exchange signals a goal to minimize effort by 
recommending a product right away without investing time or energy to determine 
unique customer needs:
Customer: My husband and I want to buy a stove this weekend and 
just don’t know much about them. 
Salesperson: Alright. Are you, do you cook a lot? 
Customer: Um, three to four times week. 
Salesperson: Okay, well, this is going to probably one of the 
best. [places hand on product in front of him] 
As evidenced above, the tone of the conversation is usually formal6, with little 
discussion outside of what is professionally required. Pursuit of this goal is further 
evidenced by the salesperson providing evaluation-based information regarding 
the product rather than feature-based information. Doing so lessens the amount of 
6 Although these conversations tend to be shorter and formal, there were no observations of any salespeople 
who appeared to be annoyed or curt during an encounter. 
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time and energy exerted to provide detailed feature-based product information to 
a customer. This observation is in line with the representative heuristic 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1972; Tversky and Kahneman 1971; 1974), which 
suggests that salespeople tend to believe that customers act similarly, such that 
they assume most customers shopping for a range will share the same preferences 
and be satisfied with the same product choice. Therefore, salespeople rely on 
evaluation-based feedback demonstrating that they assume the current customer 
will want the same product as other customers:      
Customer: Okay. Why would you consider these? What about 
them makes them the best? 
Salesperson: Mainly, it’s just the feedback I hear back from 
customers. 
Minimizing effort drives salespeople to offer few opinions or subjective 
preferences, which would require additional time, thought, and energy. While minimizing 
effort results in less discussion of features with a customer, when a salesperson does 
present features, they are unlikely to link to the customer’s needs. This point is evidenced 
by the following exchange in which a salesperson discusses features of a product 
(convection fan and 6 cu. foot capacity) without prior knowledge of, or reference to, the 
customer’s needs regarding convection or capacity: 
Salesperson: This [model] is a nice range. It’s got the triple 
convection fan; it’s got the bigger cavity. It’s a 6 cubic foot cavity.  
Customer: That’s big. 
Salesperson: And then there’s the triple convection fan. 
As a result of these observations, we offer the following proposition:  
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 P2:  A recommendation goal to minimize effort is signaled by 
   communication with (a) shorter duration, (b) unilateral 
   conversation, (c) a formal tone, (d) a focus on evaluation-
   based information, (e) objectivity from the salesperson, (f) 
   and minimal emphasis on feature-need linkage. 
3.4.1.3 Minimizing Negative Emotions  
We define the goal to minimize negative emotions as the extent to which a 
salesperson is motivated to reduce the uncomfortable feelings associated with the 
responsibility of recommending the best product to a customer (e.g., Luce 1998). 
Drawing upon Lazarus’ (1991) theory of emotion elicitation, the first step in a 
salesperson generating emotions is assessing the level of his responsibility with a process. 
In the second step, he assesses the emotions he may feel after the recommendation 
process as either negative or positive. Finally, he identifies the exact emotion he may 
feel. Correspondingly, we argue that salespeople first recognize that they play a 
significant role in the recommendation process because the customer has sought their 
help. Then they recognize the potential for negative emotions if they recommend the 
wrong product, or positive emotions if they recommend the best product. They further 
identify these emotions as guilt and regret (Janis and Mann 1977), or satisfaction, 
respectively. Thus, the salesperson is driven to minimize the potential feeling of guilt 
associated with their responsibility if the best product is not recommended.  
In contrast to self decision-making which suggests two methods for coping with 
negative emotions (i.e., problem-focused coping and emotion-focused coping) (e.g., 
Folkman and Lazarus 1988; Luce 1998), we observe that salespeople tend to cope with 
negative emotions via one method: emotion-focused coping in the form of minimizing 
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their responsibility. Thus, salespeople tend to focus on the negative emotion (i.e., 
potential guilt) and avoid it by reducing their responsibility in the recommendation 
process. Correspondingly, customer encounters tend to be shorter, unilateral, and formal 
because the salesperson is de-emphasizing the recommendation process altogether. One 
of our key findings is that salespeople tend to reduce their responsibility by deflecting it 
back onto the customer. For instance: 
Customer: Is there any particular one that you would recommend? 
Salesperson: I can’t recommend anything. I could tell you what each 
one offers, like, their information. I can do that. The choice is 
ultimately yours.  
In a different encounter, the salesperson deflects responsibility by reminding the 
customer that the choice is ultimately theirs (i.e., “whatever you choose”): 
Salesperson: Well, I mean to be honest with you, I never owned [that 
model] but I can tell you that whatever you choose, I know you are 
going to be happy with it. 
By deflecting responsibility back onto customers, salespeople are essentially 
attempting to share blame if the wrong product is recommended or purchased. Dunning, 
Pecotich, and O'Cass (2004) suggest that sharing blame with a third party can reduce an 
individual’s feelings of responsibility with a decision. Furthermore, previous self-other 
decision-making literature has suggested that the further someone removes themselves 
from the decision-making context, the more likely they are to think abstractly and 
generalized rather than focusing on fine details (Trope and Liberman 2003). Therefore, 
salespeople who are driven to minimize responsibility are less focused on detail-oriented 
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feature-based product information and are more likely to refer to evaluation-based 
information.  
While minimizing responsibility makes it less likely that a salesperson offers a 
personal opinion, when they do, they are more likely to add a disclaimer to state that it 
may not reflect customer needs. In doing so, they downplay their role and indirectly place 
the responsibility back on the customer. This point is exemplified in the following 
salesperson’s disclaimer that the information they are sharing regarding the price of the 
product is “just personal opinion”. This salesperson implies that he should not be held 
responsibility for his personal opinions and the customer will need to form their own: 
Customer: So is there a particular manufacturer that you 
recommend? 
Salesperson: [Manufacturer] does good cooking. I feel they are little 
overpriced for some of the stuff that they do but it depends on what 
model you're looking at and that's just my personal opinion on their 
stuff. It’s really based on your brand preference. 
Based on the preceding arguments, we propose: 
 P3:  A recommendation goal to minimize negative emotion is 
   signaled by communication with (a) shorter duration, (b) 
   unilateral conversation, (c) a formal tone, (d) a focus on 
   evaluation-based information, (e) subjectivity from the 
   salesperson, (f) and minimal emphasis on feature-need 
   linkage. 
3.4.1.4 Maximizing Ease of Justification  
We define the goal to maximize the ease of justification as the extent to which a 
salesperson is motivated to recommend product(s) with the simplest explanation (e.g., 
Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). Salespeople with this goal attempt to make the 
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recommendation process as psychologically easy for themselves as possible by seeking a 
product to recommend because it has an easily-justifiable attribute (e.g., recommending 
the range with the lowest price) or attributes (e.g., recommending a range that has most of 
the features that customers typically like) (Zajonc 1980). Recommendations are self-other 
decisions that exist entirely in a social context with other people (i.e., customers). Thus, 
the salesperson is expected to be able to justify her recommendation to the customer 
requesting it. While this goal is often associated with minimizing effort, it may be a result 
of previous sales experience in which the salesperson has developed a heuristic of which 
products sell well (e.g., a particular manufacturer or a particular price point) compared to 
those that do not (Shafir, Simonson, Tversky 1993). 
When a salesperson is pursuing a goal to maximize the ease of justifying her 
recommendations, she is making the process psychologically easy for herself by focusing 
on the reasons to recommend a product rather than focusing on the product itself (e.g., 
Dhar and Gorlin 2013; Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky 1993; Simonson 1989). For 
example, a salesperson perceives a product in terms of the many ways it can be justified 
(e.g., fewest customer returns or lowest price) rather than looking at a product as a whole 
set of feature-based and evaluation-based attributes. Oftentimes, the salesperson is 
excessively focused on the justifications of a product, such that they begin discussing 
justifications even before assessing customer needs (e.g., Shafir, Simonson, Tversky 
1993). For example, in the following encounter a salesperson focuses on the justification 
of her recommendation (triple burner), before taking time to ask about customer needs 
and matching them to the products available: 
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Customer:  My husband and I plan to buy a range this weekend and 
don’t know much about them. 
Salesperson:  Do you cook a lot? 
Customer:  Three to four times week. 
Salesperson:  I would go with the GE just because I love the triple 
burner. You can use any sized-pan you want there and then you got 
the two standard here too. 
Because the salesperson de-emphasizes customer needs, these conversations tend 
to be shorter in duration and unilateral in nature, with the salesperson doing most of the 
talking. The goal of maximizing ease of justification implies that the salesperson is 
aiming to simplify the process for themselves, which is better accomplished when the 
tone is informal so that the customer is comfortable and trusting without pushing back or 
arguing (Spradley 1979). 
Bettman, Luce, Payne (1998) suggest that a goal to maximize ease of justification 
drives decision-makers to weigh the outcome of the decision (i.e., performance of the 
product) more heavily than the process leading to the decision (i.e., processing of 
attributes). Similarly, we suggest that a goal to maximize the ease of justification drives 
salespeople to rely more heavily on evaluation-based information sources that tend to 
emphasize performance of the product (e.g., customer returns, reviews or complaints 
after using the product) rather than feature-based information. This point is made 
explicitly clear in the following exchange: 
Customer: Why do you love [this model]?  
Salesperson: It works. 
Customer: It works, okay.  
Salesperson: You have very few service problems.  
83 
 
As a result of not taking the time to extensively uncover needs throughout the 
conversation, the salesperson is not able to link the justifications they are providing with 
the customer’s needs or preferences. Thus, there is minimal feature-need linkage. Given 
the preceding observations, we suggest the following: 
 P4:  A recommendation goal to maximize ease of justification is 
   signaled by communication with (a) shorter duration, (b) 
   unilateral conversation, (c) an informal tone, (d) a focus on 
   evaluation-based information, (e) subjectivity from the 
   salesperson, (f) and minimal emphasis on feature-need 
   linkage. 
3.4.1.5 Goals Discussion  
Drawing upon our field study and constant comparison to the literature, our 
research on self-other recommendation goals complements previous literature on self 
decision-making goals. However, there is a sharp contrast in the prevalence of the four 
goals. The self decision-making literature suggests that maximizing accuracy and 
minimizing effort are the two most prevalent goals, with the desire to trade-off between 
these two goals as the driving force for the rest of the decision-making process (Bettman, 
Luce, and Payne 1998; Dhar and Gorlin 2013; Johnson and Payne 1985; Payne 1982). 
Alternatively, findings that emerge from our observations indicate that the least prevalent 
goals observed among salespeople are maximizing accuracy and minimizing effort. 
Instead, there is strong evidence that minimizing negative emotion and maximizing ease 
of justification are the most commonly pursued goals by salespeople. This may be 
because the salesperson is employed to regularly apply effort towards helping customers 
choose the best product. With accuracy and effort expected by the nature of their 
employment, the salesperson then toggles between the desire to make the 
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recommendation process easier for themselves and minimize their negative emotions 
throughout the process. 
In addition, unlike previous self decision-making research which suggests that 
decision-making strategies signal underlying decision-making goals, our research 
suggests that communication facets can serve as signals for underlying decision-making 
goals. Like prior self decision-making research, however, we observe that goals prompt 
different strategies that salespeople use in processing information about the products 
available. Next, we discuss the types of strategies that salespeople use in the 
recommendation process. 
3.4.2 Strategies 
A strategy is the information processing method a salesperson uses to evaluate 
product alternatives (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). This includes the 
determination of which attributes are evaluated (e.g., price and burner size) and how the 
importance of those attributes are weighted (e.g., price is most important). Much like the 
recommendation goals discussed earlier, it is difficult to observe the information 
processing strategies used by salespeople unless they are explicitly manipulated (e.g., 
Kray 2000; Fischhoff 1992; Kray and Gonzalez 1999). Thus, in the same way that 
observable communication facets can signal unobservable goals, we suggest that 
observable justifications can signal unobservable strategies. 
Prior research suggests that self-other decision-makers evaluate attributes of 
products differently than self decision-makers do (e.g., Kray 2000, Fischhoff 1992, Kray 
and Gonazales 1999; Tversky et al., 1988). Similarly, our findings suggest that only two 
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of the well-known ‘self’ strategies were observed among salespeople: lexicographic and 
equal weight7. Use of these simpler strategies by salespeople is consistent with previous 
research which suggests that as the decision-making process becomes more complex, the 
strategy used to process information tends to become simpler (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 
1998). A recommendation made for a customer is more complex than a choice made by a 
customer due to difficulties in eliciting and decoding pertinent and accurate customer 
information as well as in integrating potentially conflicting preferences between 
salespeople and customers.  
A lexicographic strategy emphasizes one attribute at a time, such that the 
salesperson processes information to determine which product ranks highest on a single 
attribute (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). If there is tie among products on the most 
important attribute (e.g., price is most important and two products have the same low 
price), then those products are further evaluated on the second most important attribute. 
For example, among the two products with the same low price, the salesperson may 
evaluate them based on the number of burners such that the product with the most 
burners (and lowest price) emerges as the single dominant product. This is consistent 
with prior research on self-other decision-making (e.g., Kray 2000; Kray and Gonzalez 
1999; Lu, Xie, and Xu 2012), which suggests that people making decisions for others 
tend to anchor on fewer attributes, while people making decisions for themselves tend to 
consider many attributes. We argue that use of a lexicographic strategy is evidenced by 
salespeople providing a single justification for the product they recommend.  
                                                          
7 Salespeople may use more than these two strategies when processing information; however, our study 
surfaced use of only these two established strategies. 
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We find additional evidence that salespeople process information via an equal 
weight strategy. An equal weight strategy emphasizes more than one attribute at a time, 
such that the salesperson processes information to determine which product(s) rank 
highest on multiple attributes; however, those attributes are not weighted for importance 
(Bettman, Luce, Payne 1998). For example, a salesperson may evaluate products based 
on three attributes: the number of burners, price, and Consumer Reports ranking. 
Notably, we did not observe any instances in which salespeople explicitly weighted 
multiple attributes (e.g., valued price as the most important attribute, then number of 
burners, then Consumer Reports ranking). Thus, several products which have similar 
rankings for the three attributes may emerge as the dominant products. We argue that the 
use of this strategy is signaled by salespeople providing a list of justifications (typically 
three or more) without emphasizing any particular one.  
Unlike prior research, our observations suggest that these two strategies can be 
further distinguished based on the locus of the strategy – either self or self-other. Here, 
self strategies are signaled by justifications emphasizing the salesperson’s needs or 
preferences8, while self-other strategies are signaled by justifications which largely 
reflect the customer’s needs or preferences. We use the term “largely” because it is likely 
difficult for salespeople to completely remove their own preferences from their 
information processing. 
                                                          
8 Throughout this research, “self” decision-making refers to decision-making for oneself. Thus, a self 
strategy used by salespeople refers to decision-making based on their preferences (i.e., self decision-
making does not have to refer only to customer decision-making based on customer preferences). 
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Research from psychology suggests that decision-makers often act on intuitive, 
nonconscious processes (e.g., quickly applying rules of thumb or recommending products 
they are familiar with) rather than deliberate information-processing strategies (e.g., 
Kahneman 2003). Thus, despite sales training or management direction to listen to 
customer needs, it is possible that salespeople revert back to a reliance on particular 
attributes that are important to them (self strategies) rather than consciously processing 
attributes that are important to their customer (self-other strategies). Thus, the distinction 
of self and self-other strategies manifests itself in four distinct strategies: self 
lexicographic, self equal weight, self-other lexicographic, and self-other equal weight.  
A key finding in this study is the emergence of fifth strategy of information 
processing: product homogenization. A salesperson using a product homogenization 
strategy emphasizes the similarities among the products rather than the differences. 
Interestingly, all self decision-making strategies highlight differences in alternative 
products in hopes that one of the alternatives emerges as dominant. For example, one’s 
lexicographic strategy involves differentiating products based on one attribute such that 
the highest scoring product for that particular attribute emerges as the dominant choice. 
However, with the product homogenization strategy, salespeople are processing (i.e., 
looking for) the similarities in the alternative products rather than the differences. Next, 




3.4.2.1 Self Lexicographic  
Use of a self lexicographic strategy is signaled by a salesperson providing one 
justification for their recommendation, in which the justification is an attribute of 
importance to the salesperson. The emphasis on salesperson, rather than customer, needs 
and preferences suggests that information processing can occur independently of the 
conversation with the customer, during which customer needs and preferences could have 
been uncovered. Use of one justification signals that the salesperson finds one attribute to 
be of utmost importance. This strategy is exemplified in the following encounter with the 
salesperson justifying her recommendation based on one attribute (capacity) that is 
important to her rather than the customer. She makes this clear by emphasizing that it’s 
an attribute that she likes. 
Customer: You would recommend this one? 
Salesperson: Yeah. I like this one because there is a lot of room in 
there and you can put several things in there. I mean, it’s really, 
really big capacity. I like that. 
In a different encounter, the salesperson follows a similar self lexicographic 
strategy in processing information based on cleaning capabilities, which is important to 
her, but never discussed vis-à-vis her customer’s needs:  
Customer: So, is this the one that you would recommend? 
Salesperson: [Manufacturer] has this one that I like for their 
cleaning. It’s has the aqua clean technology. This is the one I 
recommend. The [manufacturer] with the aqua clean, I really do like 
that. 
Use of the self lexicographic strategy implies that salespeople do not link their 
information processing with customer needs. This may be because a salesperson does not 
89 
 
invest time and energy to uncover customer needs, or that he seeks to simplify the 
process for himself by reverting to his personal preferences which are easier to justify. It 
is unlikely that a salesperson who is maximizing accuracy and spending time uncovering 
customer needs would ignore those needs completely and process information via this 
strategy. Furthermore, salespeople minimizing negative emotion seek to minimize the 
potential blame associated with recommending a particular product to a customer. Thus, 
it is unlikely that they would process information based on their own personal 
preferences which may not reflect customer needs and could increase the likelihood of 
customer blame. As such, we propose that salespeople who have not taken the time to 
uncover needs, or those that seek the easiest justification for a product, are more likely to 
process information via a self lexicographic strategy:  
 P5: Salespeople who use a self lexicographic recommendation strategy 
   are likely to have minimizing effort and maximizing ease of  
   justification as underlying goals.  
3.4.2.2 Self Equal Weight  
Use of a self equal weight strategy is signaled by a salesperson providing multiple 
unweighted justifications for their recommendation, in which the justifications are of 
importance to the salesperson. Thus, similar to the self lexicographic strategy, the 
salesperson using a self equal weight strategy does not link justifications of a 
recommendation to the customer’s needs or preferences. A self equal weight strategy 
may also be indicative of a salesperson with a list of unweighted justifications for why 
they believe a particular product is the best one, such that they have sought a product 
which will be easy to recommend due to its generally high scores across several equally 
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important attributes. In the following encounter, a salesperson processes information 
about the product alternatives using an equal weight strategy, signaled by a list of 
unweighted attributes (price, burner size, warming center, convection, hidden heating 
unit). However, because attributes are not linked to any needs or preferences of the 
customer, it implies that the justifications are important to the salesperson: 
Customer: Which one would you recommend? 
Salesperson: This one. It’s usually $1,200.00 and it's on sale for 
$950.00. There's a big difference with this one. This gives you 
twelve, nine and six inch burner, and a warming center. This gives 
you the true European convection in here. It's actually got a double 
fan with the heating element wrapped around it and that gives you 
the uniform heat throughout. The heating unit for the oven is 
actually underneath that tray so if you spill something, it doesn't spill 
onto the heating unit. 
Similar to the self lexicographic strategy, the self equal weight strategy implies 
that the salesperson has not uncovered customer needs, or simplifies the process for 
herself by reverting back to her personal preferences which are easy to justify. Thus, it is 
unlikely that a salesperson who is maximizing accuracy would process information via 
this self strategy. Additionally, salespeople minimizing negative emotion seek to 
minimize the potential blame associated with recommending a particular product and, 
therefore, would likely be hesitant to process information based on their personal 
preferences. As such, we propose that salespeople who have not taken the time to 
uncover needs, or those that seek the easiest justification for a product, are more likely to 
process via a self equal weight strategy: 
P6: Salespeople who use a self equal weight recommendation strategy 
are likely to have minimizing effort and maximizing ease of  
justification as underlying goals.  
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3.4.2.3 Self-other Lexicographic  
Use of a self-other lexicographic strategy is signaled by a salesperson providing 
one justification for their recommendation, in which the justification largely reflects the 
customer’s needs and preferences. Due to the design of this study in which the author did 
not overtly anchor on one attribute, this strategy was unobserved. Although unobserved, 
it is certainly likely that salespeople may process information about products based on 
one attribute that is very important to the customer. For example, if a customer tells the 
salesperson that they are looking for the least expensive range, the salesperson will likely 
evaluate products based solely on price and recommend the least expensive range.  
A self-other lexicographic strategy suggests that a salesperson has uncovered a 
need or preference of a customer and integrated it into the evaluation of products. Thus, it 
is likely that a salesperson who is maximizing accuracy may process information about 
the products available based on the most important attribute to a unique customer. 
Furthermore, incorporating customer needs into the evaluation and scoring of products 
allows the salesperson to share blame with the customer if the best product is not 
recommended. Thus, those salespeople who are maximizing accuracy or minimizing 
negative emotion are likely to use this self-other strategy. Alternatively, a salesperson 
who is minimizing effort or maximizing ease of justification simplifies the process for 
themselves and does not likely uncover customer needs and, therefore, would not 
evaluate products using a self-other strategy. Thus, we present the following proposition: 
P7: Salespeople who use a self-other lexicographic recommendation 
strategy are likely to have maximizing accuracy or minimizing 
negative emotion as underlying goals.  
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3.4.2.4 Self-other Equal Weight 
Use of a self-other equal weight strategy is signaled by a salesperson providing a 
set of justifications for their recommendation, in which the justifications largely reflect 
the customer’s needs and preferences. Similar to self-other lexicographic, this strategy 
signals that the salesperson is recommending a product based on what will satisfy the 
unique needs of the customer. We find evidence that salespeople processing information 
with this strategy provide a set of justifications which incorporate the evaluation of many 
unweighted attributes rather than just one. 
The salesperson in the following encounter signals that he processed information 
across several attributes (quality of materials, burner sizes/expandability, and warming 
center). Further, he links those attributes to a need or preference of the customer (“you 
said four nights a week you’re doing your cooking on a cooktop”). This signals that the 
two products he recommends (both from the same manufacturer) ranked highest across 
several unweighted attributes that fit the customer’s needs: 
Salesperson: [Manufacturer’s] products are not, you know, plastic. 
Some of the other guys that I’ve seen out there who have plastic 
outside, and then, they just put metal on the inside just to keep it 
weighty. So, this is real metal. I mean it’s—you said four nights a 
week you’re doing your cooking on your cook top, you know, these 
have lots of expandability. So again, you can go from the small to 
medium size or from a medium to a large, it’s also about the 
warming center. So, you can do things like keep things at a simmer. 
Similar to the self-other lexicographic strategy, use of a self-other equal weight 
strategy suggests that a salesperson has uncovered multiple needs and preferences of a 
customer. Thus, it is likely that a salesperson who is maximizing accuracy would be 
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better equipped to process information via a self-other strategy. Furthermore, 
incorporating customer needs allows the salesperson to share blame with the customer if 
the best product is not recommended. Therefore, salespeople who are maximizing 
accuracy or minimizing negative emotion are more likely to use a self-other strategy than 
salespeople who are driven to simplify the process for themselves and do not uncover 
customer needs (i.e., minimizing effort, maximizing ease of justification). Based on the 
preceding arguments, we present the following proposition: 
P8: Salespeople who use a self-other equal weight recommendation 
strategy are likely to have maximizing accuracy as an underlying 
goal.  
3.4.2.5 Product Homogenization  
An additional strategy for information processing emerged from our study which 
is in sharp contrast to previous literature on decision-making strategies. A product 
homogenization strategy is signaled by a salesperson processing (i.e., looking for) the 
similarities among products rather than the differences, leading to justifications such “you 
can’t go wrong with any of these,” or “they’re all good”. Our results suggest that 
salespeople are surprisingly quick to homogenize the products they are selling and do so 
at various points of the encounter. Here, a salesperson homogenizes products at the very 
beginning of an encounter by stating that they all do the same thing (get hot): 
Salesperson: Ranges don’t do a whole lot. They just get hot.  
In a different encounter, the salesperson homogenizes products towards 
the end of the conversation, when asked if there were any products to avoid: 
94 
Customer: Are there any that we should stay away from, that you 
would not recommend?  
Salesperson: Well, they're all good. They all generally use the same 
technology. 
Use of the product homogenization strategy signals that the salesperson is 
unwilling or unable to distinguish among the products available to sell to the customer. 
As it is unlikely that someone specifically trained to sell appliances is unable to recognize 
their differences, this strategy is more likely indicative of salespeople being unwilling to 
distinguish among the products. A goal to maximize accuracy involves fitting products to 
unique customer needs; thus, it is incongruent with a strategy which homogenizes the 
products and makes it more difficult to find a customer-product fit. A goal to maximize 
ease of justification suggests that a salesperson is driven to evaluate products based on 
how easy they are to justify (i.e., differentiate) to a customer; thus, by definition, this goal 
would not be indicative of homogenizing products. Alternatively, a minimizing effort 
goal is suited to a homogenization strategy because it involves little time or energy. 
Minimizing negative emotion is the manifestation of deflecting the responsibility, and 
potential blame, of making a recommendation. Thus, salespeople minimizing negative 
emotion may eschew the responsibility associated with evaluating or ranking the 
differences among products. Based on the preceding logic, we propose the following: 
P9: Salespeople who use a product homogenization recommendation 
strategy are likely to have minimizing effort and minimizing 
negative emotion as underlying goals.  
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3.4.2.6 Strategy Discussion  
Although there are some similarities between the strategies we surface and those 
identified in the self decision-making literature, there are also several notable differences.  
First, among those salespeople that integrated customer needs, there was a surprising lack 
of attribute weighting. Most known decision-making strategies involve identifying 
attributes of interest and the unique weighting of the importance of those attributes (Lu, 
Xie, and Xu 2012; Kray 2000; Kray and Gonzalez 1999), such that products can be 
scored and ranked. For example, a customer may evaluate a product based on the number 
of burners, presence of a warming drawer, and customer ratings, with customer ratings 
being the most important among those three (i.e., weighted adding strategy). Because all 
three attributes can exist on multiple similar products, it is important to determine which 
attribute is most important to the customer in order to reach a final recommendation. 
Surprisingly, there were no instances out of 71 encounters in which the salesperson asked 
the author which attribute was most important in purchasing a range (e.g., “What is the 
main thing you’re looking for in a range?”). By ignoring which attributes are most 
important to the customer, the salesperson limits the use of the many known weight-
based strategies (e.g., weighted adding, satisficing, etc.). 
Second, the extant self decision-making literature tends to rely on types of 
strategies as the signal for the goal being pursued (e.g., Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). 
For example, use of a weighted-adding strategy signals an underlying goal to maximize 
accuracy. We take a similar approach, but suggest that the locus of strategies can signal 
underlying recommendation goals, more so than type. For example, we propose that 
maximizing accuracy gives way to both self-other lexicographic and equal weight 
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strategies because the salesperson incorporates customer needs, whereas minimizing 
effort gives way to both self lexicographic and equal weight strategies because the 
salesperson does not take time to uncover customer needs. This provides further evidence 
for the importance of understanding the locus of strategy in the recommendation process. 
Third, the vast majority of salespeople we observed relied on self (reflective of 
their own preferences), rather than self-other (reflective of customer preferences), 
strategies. This is surprising given that these salespeople are employed to help customers 
choose the product that best fits the customer’s needs. This suggests that, despite 
conversations with customers, salespeople often revert back to products that possess 
attributes of importance to themselves. The strategies used by salespeople to process 
information give way to the recommendation they ultimately provide. Next, we discuss 
the various types of recommendations provided by salespeople. 
3.4.3 Recommendation 
A recommendation is a salesperson’s suggestion of a product or products to a 
customer. Three distinct types of recommendations emerged from our study: definitive 
recommendation (salesperson suggests a single product to the customer), narrowed 
recommendation (salesperson suggests a limited set of products to the customer), and 
recommendation refusal (salesperson is unable or unwilling to suggest a product or 
products to the customer). The addition of narrowed recommendations complements 
consumer research which identifies two types of choices: choice (i.e., customer purchases 
dominant product) or no choice (i.e., customer does not make a purchase or delays the 
purchase until more information can be evaluated) (Dhar 1997; Dhar and Simonson 
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2003). In consumer research, the choice and no choice options are typically assessed by 
presenting a subject with a choice decision and measuring their likelihood of purchasing 
a product or actual product selection (e.g., Dhar and Simonson 2003).  
Observation of the narrowed and refusal recommendation types are consistent 
with prior research which suggests that having to justify an evaluation of products to 
other people, rather than just to oneself, results in a less selective decision (i.e., less 
definitive) (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). For example, a salesperson needing to 
justify his recommendation to a customer may limit his willingness to make a definitive 
one. Thus, a salesperson may propose a set of products (narrowed recommendation) or 
recommend no products at all (recommendation refusal). In this study, we explicitly 
asked each salesperson for a recommendation.  
3.4.3.1 Definitive Recommendation  
Salespeople providing a definitive recommendation suggest a single product to 
the customer. Although salespeople may have demonstrated or shown preferences 
towards multiple products throughout the process, they ultimately recommend a single 
product (Biehal and Chakravarti 1983). Dhar (1997) suggests that the ability to arrive at a 
definitive choice is a result of being able to recognize the differences among the products, 
which is made easier when the products vary in their attributes and attractiveness (i.e., 
weighting) on those attributes. Trained salespeople should be able to recognize the 
differences among the products they sell, and weigh the importance of particular 
attributes based on self or self-other preferences. In the following encounter, the 
salesperson provides a definitive recommendation: 
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Salesperson:  You may want to read up on convection. This 
[manufacturer- which has convection] has a better price. 
Customer:  The [manufacturer]? 
Salesperson:  This [manufacturer] has a better price…This is my 
choice. 
Similarly, in a different encounter, the salesperson had shown preference to a 
particular manufacturer’s products throughout the conversation and consequently 
provided a definitive recommendation for a particular model from that manufacturer: 
Customer:  Is there a particular [manufacturer] model that you 
recommend? 
Salesperson:  Yeah, this one over here.   
A definitive recommendation relies on one product emerging as the dominant 
alternative among a set of products. This implies that the salesperson evaluated the 
differences among the products, making it unlikely that they utilized a product 
homogenization strategy. Alternatively, processing via a lexicographic or equal weight 
strategy signals that a single attribute (lexicographic) or multiple attributes (equal weight) 
have been evaluated based on the salesperson’s (self) or the customer’s (self-other) 
preferences. Therefore, if a product ranks highest on a single attribute or outscores all 
other products across several unweighted attributes, then a dominant product can emerge 
among the set of all available products. Thus, we propose the following: 
P10: Salespeople who process information via a self lexicographic, self 
equal weight, self-other lexicographic, or self-other equal weight  
strategy are likely to provide a definitive recommendation.  
99 
 
3.4.3.2 Narrowed Recommendation  
A salesperson providing a narrowed recommendation suggests a limited set of 
products to the customer. This recommendation type emerged when salespeople 
suggested two to three products without preference to a single product, even if explicitly 
asked. We observed that salespeople were oftentimes able to differentiate products such 
that a small set was dominant relative to others, but were unable or unwilling to 
differentiate them any further. This was the case if the salesperson failed to ask the 
customer how they weigh the importance of individual attributes. One salesperson 
illustrates a narrowed recommendation type for two different products:  
Salesperson: Alright, I would probably go with this [pointing to a 
range] or that [pointing to a different range].  
A different salesperson narrowed down her recommendation to two products from 
different manufacturers. She could potentially narrow her recommendation further based 
on the response to her statement about other appliances in the house, but glosses over it 
and ultimately reiterates her narrowed recommendation: 
Customer: Okay. Is this one that you recommend? 
Salesperson: I would. I mean I would recommend this one 
[pointing] or this one [pointing]. Depends on other appliances you 
have in the house. [Manufacturer A] is good. [Manufacturer B’s] are 
actually good as well. You have your warming all up here. It pretty 
much works in the same way. Both of them are self-cleaned so no 
cleaning at all. This one here has three trays at the bottom. Then that 
one has these trays here. 
A narrowed recommendation does not rely on the emergence of a single product 
as the dominant alternative. Instead, multiple products that possess similar scores across 
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the attributes of interest may be recommended. Processing via a self, or self-other equal 
weight strategy likely results in a set of products that contain similar scores on the 
multiple attributes of interest largely to the salesperson (self) or customer (self-other). 
However, when a lexicographic strategy is used, a single dominant product ultimately 
emerges. Thus, it is unlikely that a salesperson would recognize a single dominant 
product, yet recommend multiple. Furthermore, a narrowed recommendation signals that 
a set of products have emerged which may be similar to each other, but differ from other 
products; thus, it is unlikely that a salesperson processing information via a product 
homogenization strategy in which several products are deemed similar would provide a 
narrowed recommendation. Therefore, we propose the following: 
P11: Salespeople who process information via a self equal weight or  
self-other equal weight strategy are likely to provide a narrowed 
recommendation. 
3.4.3.3 Recommendation Refusal 
A salesperson refusing to provide a recommendation is unable or unwilling to 
suggest a product or products to the customer. Rational theory suggests when no 
dominant alternative emerges from a set, it can be difficult or unreasonable to make a 
choice (e.g., Dhar 1997; Karni and Schwarz 1977; Tversky and Shafir 1992). Likewise, a 
salesperson’s unwillingness to propose a product, despite being asked to do so, may be 
the result of perceiving no dominant product(s) to recommend, or of avoiding the task of 
determining the dominant product(s). It is unlikely that trained salespeople are unable to 
recognize a dominant product or products to fit the customer’s needs from among the 
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available products; however, it is likely that they may be unwilling to do so if they are 
avoiding responsibility. This point is made clear in the following encounter: 
Customer:  Which one would you recommend? 
Salesperson:  Well, I really, I couldn’t make that decision for you. 
In a different encounter, the salesperson spent several minutes demonstrating the 
features of a particular model offered by Manufacturer A. In fact, he did not look at, or 
make reference to, any other models throughout the conversation. However, when 
directly asked if that is the model he recommends, he ultimately refuses to make a 
recommendation, minimizes the differences between them, and deflects back to the 
customer:  
Customer:  So then do you recommend this [manufacturer A]? 
Salesperson:  Well, I don't really recommend anybody. It's your 
preference. They’re all good. It's just a matter of your preference. 
When a salesperson processes information via a product homogenization strategy, 
she minimizes the differences among the products such that no product appears to be 
better than any other. Therefore, the salesperson is likely unwilling to propose a product 
or products to the customer. Alternatively, lexicographic and equal weight strategies 
indicate that a salesperson processes information about the attribute(s) of interest for each 
product, resulting in either a dominant product or set of products. Thus, it is unlikely that 
a salesperson would recognize a dominant product or products and not recommend them 
to the customer. Based on this logic, we propose the following:  
 P12: Salespeople who process information via a product    
   homogenization strategy are likely to provide a recommendation  
   refusal. 
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3.5 Recommendation Accuracy 
The development of a recommendation process gives rise to important questions 
regarding its use, such as, “Are there particular recommendation goals that are more 
likely to result in better recommendations? How can customers determine whether or not 
they are receiving a good recommendation?” Answers to these questions would help 
customers determine the value they place on a recommendation. As evidenced by the 
recommendation of 31 different products in this study, there is oftentimes a discrepancy 
between what a salesperson recommends and what they should have recommended based 
on the customer’s needs. Thus, we define recommendation accuracy as the extent to 
which the product(s) suggested by a salesperson fits the customer’s needs. 
To the best of our knowledge, previous research on self-other decision-making 
has not linked recommendations to their objective accuracy. Therefore, we make an 
initial attempt to better understand the impact of the recommendation process on 
recommendation accuracy by linking the goals of a salesperson with third-party accuracy 
data. We emphasize the link of goals to accuracy rather than strategies or 
recommendation types for three reasons. First, goals are likely to be salient and 
identifiable to customers based on the communication signals we surface. Second, goals 
drive the rest of the recommendation process and, thus, are likely to have an underlying 
impact on the accuracy resulting from other steps of the process.  Lastly, because 
recommendation accuracy can be a function of the path from goals to strategies to 
recommendations (i.e., 60 possible paths), it would be premature with our qualitative data 
to link accuracy to one or more of these paths. 
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We draw upon Consumer Reports as a third-party, objective assessment of 
recommendation accuracy (Appendix A2.4). The accuracy measure presented here is a 
reflection of whether or not the salesperson’s recommendation fell within the list of top 
ten products generated by Consumer Reports. The top ten list was generated based on a 
set of product parameters entered by the authors, which mirrors the predetermined 
responses used in the participant observation encounters (Table 3.2). For example, if a 
salesperson asked for the budget, the author told them it was $1,000; thus, one of the 
parameters used to generate the list of products in Consumer Reports was a budget of 
$1,000. In total, these ten products were ranked one through six due to ties within the top 
ten (e.g., there were three products that tied for first place). Of the 71 encounters, 14 were 
removed from this analysis due to the salesperson refusing to provide a recommendation. 
Of the remaining 57 cases, we provide the total count of salespeople signaling a 
particular goal, along with the percentage of those salespeople who recommend a product 
in the top ten, and the percentage of salespeople who recommend a product that is not in 
the top ten (Table 3.4). If the salesperson provided a narrowed recommendation of two or 
more products, both products had to be in the top ten in order to be counted as a top ten 
recommendation. Note, some salespeople signaled more than one goal; thus, the total 
count of goal pursuance is greater than the total number of salespeople examined.  
The summary statistics of recommendation accuracy are shown in Table 3.4. The 
results suggest that salespeople pursuing goals to maximize accuracy or minimize 
negative emotion have a higher percentage of top ten recommendations than salespeople 
pursuing goals to minimize effort or maximize ease of justification. It is not surprising 
that a goal to maximize accuracy has the highest frequency of top ten recommendations 
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given that they are driven to uncover the most accurate product. What is surprising, is 
that the frequency of top ten recommendations is not higher than observed (61%) among 
those salespeople. This indicates that of salespeople driven to recommend an accurate 
product, 39% did not reach the top ten products. Furthermore, the findings suggest that 
goals to minimize effort and maximize ease of justification resulted in top ten 
recommendations in 48% and 45% of the observations, respectively. This relatively high 
level of accuracy is surprising given that both of these goals are associated with spending 
less time uncovering customer needs. This finding may reflect a salesperson’s luck in 
randomly selecting an ‘accurate’ product, or it may suggest that a salesperson’s implicit, 
snap judgement of customer needs and product fit can be fairly reliable, as opposed to the 
more lengthy process of uncovering needs and matching them to products. A goal to 
minimize negative emotion resulted in a top ten recommendation in 56% of the 
observations, which is surprising given that these salespeople shy away from the 
responsibility of recommending to the point that they often deflect it back to the 
customer, yet were not far from the frequency of those salespeople maximizing accuracy. 
Ideally, recommendation accuracy would be measured post-purchase by 
customers who bought the oven actually recommended by their salesperson to determine 
the extent to which the salesperson’s recommendation fit their unique needs. Due to the 
design of the study in which no purchases were made, we used Consumer Reports as a 
proxy for recommendation accuracy. However, there are several limitations associated 
with using Consumer Reports. First, the process used by Consumer Reports to weight 
attributes in generating final rankings is not provided. The scores assigned per attribute 
and the weighting of attributes by Consumer Reports do not likely map perfectly onto a 
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customer’s scoring and weighting of attributes (or the salesperson’s interpretation of the 
customer’s weighting). Second, the three retailers in the study sold all of the 
manufacturers’ products generated by the Consumer Reports rankings; however, due to 
the design of the study, it was not possible to ‘covertly’ verify that each of the top ten 
products were present on the floor at the time of the encounter. Note, all definitive or 
narrowed recommendations were for products shown on the retail floor, despite an 
extensive inventory available online. Thus, presence on the floor is likely to influence the 
product(s) recommended by a salesperson. Third, a few salespeople directly referred to 
Consumer Reports throughout the encounter as a source of information regarding the 
products. This may skew their recommendations towards better approximating the 
accuracy provided by Consumer Reports rather than approximating what best fits 
customer needs. Lastly, the retailers had an average of 13 products on the floor (range of 
6-21); therefore, if those floor models were selected by management based on Consumer 
Reports for a general set of popular parameters, then it is likely that by recommending 
any of the floor models, the recommendation would fall within the top ten. 
3.6 General Discussion 
In the opening vignette, we follow Lucy as she receives product recommendations 
from two salespeople from the same retail chain. Surprisingly, despite consistent product 
needs, product knowledge, and physical appearance, she is recommended two very 
different products. Why did that happen? What process did these two salespeople follow 
when making these different recommendations? The present research begins to address 
these heretofore unanswered questions and, in doing so, contributes to the self-other 
decision-making literature in the following ways.  
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This research inductively generates a self-other decision-making process with 
which salespeople provide a recommendation to a customer. Our observations suggest 
three steps in the process: goals, strategies, and recommendations. In the first step, 
salespeople are motivated by four recommendation goals: maximizing accuracy, 
minimizing effort, minimizing negative emotions, and maximizing the ease of 
justification. In comparison to the self decision-making process, our observations suggest 
that these goals differ with respect to their prevalence. Self decision-makers tend to be 
driven more often by maximizing accuracy or minimizing effort (Bettman, Luce, and 
Payne 1998), whereas our study indicates that self-other decision-makers are driven more 
often by minimizing negative emotions and maximizing ease of justification. 
Furthermore, unlike self decision-making in which goals are signaled by the use of 
particular strategies (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998), we propose that goals can be 
signaled by communication facets. Thus, we provide an additional way to infer 
underlying self-other decision-making goals. 
In addition, we uncovered a novel way in which salespeople cope with a goal of 
minimizing their negative emotions. Retail salespeople were surprisingly quick to 
minimize their responsibility with the recommendation process and hence, minimize their 
negative emotions, by deflecting responsibility back to the customer. Unlike customer 
purchase decisions in which a customer knows they have full responsibility for the 
decisions they make (i.e., online purchasing, grocery shopping), customers approach a 
salesperson to shift partial responsibility of the decision-making process. Thus, it is 
somewhat surprising that salespeople, whose job it is to help customers make good 
choices, deflect responsibility back to the customer. Such deflection of responsibility can 
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complicate the process and confuse customers, such that the customer may be hesitant to 
make a purchase. 
We also identify five strategies that salespeople use to process information. 
Lexicographic and equal weight strategies are consistent with previous research. 
However, our research suggests that these two strategies can be further categorized by 
their locus – as either self (processing based on the salesperson’s preferences) or self-
other (processing based largely on the customer’s preferences). Interestingly, we 
frequently observed salespeople who reverted back to a “self” decision-making strategy, 
regardless of what occurred during the customer-salesperson encounter. For instance, 
despite discussing customer needs earlier in the conversation, a salesperson reverted back 
to recommending a particular product he preferred because of its modern ‘look’. This 
implies that salespeople may substantially discount what customers say in favor of their 
own preferences (i.e., the salesperson’s self decision-making process). Thus, salespeople 
can complicate the decision-making process for customers who are seeking 
recommendations based on their needs – not the salesperson’s preferences. This finding 
is consistent with the false-consensus effect, which suggests that individuals overestimate 
the extent to which others hold the same beliefs and opinions as they do (Bauman and 
Geher 2002; Marks and Miller 1987; Ross, Greene, and House 1977). Thus, salespeople 
likely overestimate the extent to which others will prefer the same products they do and 
project their preferences onto the customer. 
We also observed an additional recommendation strategy, product 
homogenization, which prior research has not identified. Surprisingly, our findings 
revealed that salespeople across all three retailers were quick to homogenize products 
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despite the wide range of products and manufacturers represented on the floor. Unlike 
self decision-making strategies in which customers attempt to differentiate products, the 
product homogenization strategy consists of salespeople attempting to make products 
seem more similar. Thus, this strategy also complicates the decision-making process by 
making it more difficult for customers to recognize a dominant product to purchase. In 
fact, customers may be less likely to purchase any product if they do not feel confident 
that the salesperson can recognize a dominant one to fit their needs. 
The final step of the process involves the recommendation a salesperson provides 
to the customer. Our data suggest three types of recommendations: definitive (i.e., 
recommend a single product), narrowed (i.e., recommend a limited set of products), and 
refusal (i.e., no products are recommended). Surprisingly, we find that customers seeking 
a salesperson recommendation often fail to get one (as a result of a narrowed 
recommendation or recommendation refusal). Thus, customers are often left with the 
need to spend additional time considering products. 
3.7 Implications 
This research has implications for manufacturers, retailers, and customers. Given 
the frequency with which retail salespeople reverted back to decision-making strategies 
that reflect their personal preferences, manufacturers should (continue to) focus on 
training and familiarizing downstream retail salespeople with their particular products. 
Doing so should enhance salespeople’s preferences for particular products which, not 
surprisingly, often manifests itself in a recommendation to customers. Furthermore, 
manufacturers can increase the likelihood of their products being differentiated from 
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competitors rather than homogenized with competitors by emphasizing unique attributes 
and innovative features through hands-on demonstrations and training that compares 
products rather than lists features of a particular product. 
A conundrum occurs for retailers, however. Although retailers may appreciate the 
(free) manufacturer-specific training their salespeople receive, such a benefit may come 
at the expense of salespeople recommending products based on their product familiarity 
and personal preferences developed during training. Salesperson favoritism to a particular 
product or manufacturer may result in subpar recommendations for many customers, 
which can lower customer satisfaction and repeat purchases. Furthermore, salesperson 
favoritism toward particular products or manufactures may even disrupt retailers’ 
relationships with upstream manufacturers who expect fair consideration from retail 
salespeople. 
Retailers should also recognize the lack of consistency among and across 
salespeople making product recommendations to customers. Despite presumably 
consistent sales training by retailers, our research indicates that salespeople are likely to 
approach recommendations based on their own mental models (e.g., Wind 2006). 
Notably, salespeople from one of the retailers in this study had a worksheet to guide them 
through the sales process; however, those salespeople utilized self information processing 
strategies with the same frequency of salespeople from other retailers. This implies that 
training, or other instruments to improve the recommendation process (i.e., the 
worksheets), may be effective in teaching salespeople a sales process (e.g., what 
information to provide to customers), but not a recommendation process (e.g., what 
questions to ask, or how to incorporate customer needs into the recommendation 
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process). Thus, retailers should consider monitoring the extent to which a salesperson’s 
customer encounters reflects their sales training. For example, retailers may incorporate 
mystery shopping into their regular evaluation process to examine how readily 
salespeople uncover customer needs and integrate them throughout the recommendation 
process. 
Our research also suggests that retail salespeople frequently provide narrowed 
recommendations, or no recommendations at all. From a retailer’s perspective, this can 
be problematic because it shifts decision-making responsibility back onto customers who 
may decide against making a choice altogether. Note, the salespeople across the three 
retailers in this study were not on commission. Thus, although customer concerns about 
recommendations based on higher commission products are reduced in our setting, 
salespeople may be less likely to make a recommendation when there is no financial 
motivation to do so. As such, non-commission retailers should reconsider the pros and 
cons of providing some form of bonus to salespeople (i.e., flat rate reward for selling any 
product). Doing so may help shift task-oriented sellers into more outcome-oriented sellers 
(e.g., Anderson and Oliver 1987; Cravens et al. 1993), thereby increasing the likelihood 
that retail salespeople make definitive recommendations, and customers make a choice. 
Finally, customers should be cognizant that salespeople oftentimes make 
inaccurate recommendations, particularly when they are not linking the discussion of 
products and justifications of their recommendation to customer needs. 
Recommendations based on salesperson preferences rather than customer preference can 
result in conflicting recommendations among salespeople even within the same retailer. 
This suggests that simply by arriving ten minutes later, a customer may be approached by 
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a different salesperson and be provided a completely different recommendation. 
Customers can minimize this concern by being forthright with their preferences and 
needs, and taking steps to ensure that a true self-other recommendation is provided. For 
example, if a customer requests a recommendation by stating, “Based on our 
conversation, which product do you think would be best for me?”, there is a greater 
chance of a self-other recommendation being provided than if a customer simply asks, 
“Which product do you recommend?”  
3.8 Limitations and Further Research Directions 
As with most studies, this study has its strengths as well as its limitations. For 
instance, the design of this study allowed the authors to surface only those things that the 
salesperson outwardly portrayed or discussed. Also, salespeople were not directly asked 
about their goals or motivations or how they processed information that lead to their 
recommendation. This information would likely have been heavily filtered if asked in a 
natural setting. Indeed, prior to “going undercover”, we interviewed several retail 
salespeople about the recommendation process. Not surprisingly, each salesperson 
conveyed that their goal was to provide the best solution for a customer’s needs (i.e., 
maximize accuracy).  
In addition, the participant observations were designed to capture the 
salesperson’s recommendation process when a customer has little knowledge of the 
products. This was necessary in order to observe salespeople’s complete approach for 
evaluating all alternatives, presenting information, and recommending a product. 
However, it is common that customers have varying degrees of knowledge regarding the 
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products based on previous experience or product research. In that case, the 
recommendation process may shift from providing a recommendation based on depth 
and/or breadth of knowledge to the customer seeking confirmation that a choice that they 
have already made is the best one. For example, if a customer came in to purchase a 
particular range they had seen in Consumer Reports, they may ask the salesperson if that 
model is a good one. This would likely change the salesperson’s recommendation process 
because they are now anchored on what the customer appeared to prefer. Additionally, a 
customer with prior product knowledge may lessen a salesperson’s guilt associated with 
the responsibility of recommending a product because they sense that the customer is 
playing a more active role in the decision process and blame sharing. Thus, further 
research could explore how the customer’s prior knowledge of the products, and the 
extent to which they have already made a choice, impacts the salesperson’s 
recommendation behavior. 
Along similar lines, our study design ensured that the customer (i.e., author) did 
not portray a particular goal. For example, while it is assumed that a customer is seeking 
the best possible product recommendation, the customer never explicitly said she was 
trying to make the best choice (i.e., maximize accuracy), minimize her effort with the 
choice, minimize the negative emotions she was experiencing with the choice, or find the 
easiest product to justify. Thus, this research does not capture the interplay of the 
salesperson’s recommendation process and the customer’s decision-making process. 
Dissimilar goals between customers and salespeople may lead to a less effective 
recommendation process, as well as customer frustration. For example, if a customer is 
driven to minimize her effort but a salesperson is driven to minimize his negative 
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emotions, the customer would likely grow frustrated when the salesperson deflects 
responsibility back to the customer, whose intention was to minimize her time and 
energy. 
Similarly, this study does not capture the interplay of conflicting salesperson and 
customer strategies. A customer may process information about many attributes with 
varying degrees of importance (i.e., equal weight strategy); however, the salesperson may 
anchor on the importance of one attribute (i.e., lexicographic). For this study, we focus on 
understanding the salesperson’s recommendation process and attempt to control for the 
customer decision-making process. However, further research should consider the 
interplay of these two processes. 
 Finally, this study emphasizes the recommendation process of retail (business-to-
consumer) salespeople engaged in a one-time sales encounter with a customer. While we 
expect our research to generalize across contexts, previous research suggests that goals 
constantly fluctuate (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998). As such, the recommendation 
process may vary in the case of multiple sales encounters (e.g., three encounters with the 
same car salesperson) or long-term business-to-business relationships (e.g., weekly 
meetings over the course of a year for a large-scale project). Therefore, further research 







Encounter ID Retail Chain Address Salesperson Age Race Sex Date Time Options Recommended Brand(s) Recommended Model(s)
1 B Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 AA F 18-Jun 7:18 AM 12 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
2 C Virginia Removed for annonymity > 60 A M 18-Jun 7:38 AM 15 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
3 B Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 W M 18-Jun 8:24 AM 16 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
4 B Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 W F 18-Jun 8:48 AM 10 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
5 C Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 W M 18-Jun 9:35 AM 15 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
6 B Virginia Removed for annonymity > 60 W F 18-Jun 9:58 AM 10 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
7 C Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 AA F 18-Jun 10:58 AM 10 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
8 A Virginia Removed for annonymity < 30 W M 18-Jun 11:49 AM 12 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
9 B Virginia Removed for annonymity > 60 W F 18-Jun 12:15 PM 10 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
10 C Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 W M 18-Jun 1:02 PM 16 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
11 A Virginia Removed for annonymity < 30 W M 18-Jun 1:50 PM 13 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
12 B Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 AA F 18-Jun 2:21 PM Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
13 C Virginia Removed for annonymity > 60 W M 18-Jun 2:51 PM 19 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
14 C Virginia Removed for annonymity > 60 AA F 18-Jun 3:28 PM 14 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
15 B Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 AA F 18-Jun 4:15 PM Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
16 C Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 AA M 18-Jun 5:06 PM 15 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
17 B Virginia Removed for annonymity > 60 W M 18-Jun 5:52 PM Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
18 C Virginia Removed for annonymity > 60 W M 18-Jun Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
19 A Virginia Removed for annonymity < 30 W M 18-Jun 6:39 PM 11 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
20 A Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 AA F 18-Jun 8:23 PM 13 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
21 B Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 W M 25-Jun 8:08 AM 10 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
22 C Virginia Removed for annonymity 30-60 W M 25-Jun 8:52 AM 21 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
23 C Virginia Removed for annonymity > 60 W M 25-Jun 9:21 AM 10 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
24 B Virginia Removed for annonymity > 60 W M 25-Jun 9:50 AM 10 Removed for annonymity Removed for annonymity
Table 3.1: Encounter Log 
(Showing the first 24 Encounters) 
3.9 Tables and Figures 
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Table 3.2: Systematic Response Guide 
  
Question Systematic Response 
Power (Electric vs. Gas) Electric 
Metal/Finish Stainless Steel 
Budget Approximately $1000 
Cooking Habits 4 times per week 
Baking Habits 1 time per month 
Large Family Meal Preparation Only around holidays 
Other appliances/ desire to match  
No need to match existing (no other  
manufacturers mentioned) because all 
appliances will eventually be replaced, 
starting with the range 
Prior knowledge about particular features None 
Current manufacturer 
Relatively new home- hadn’t paid 
attention to current model 
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Long X    
Short  X X X 
Directionality 
Unilateral  X X X 
Bilateral X    
Tone 
Informal X   X 




Features X    




Objective X X   





Linked X    
Unlinked  X X X 
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Table 3.4: Recommendation Accuracy Frequencies 
 
 




Count Percentage Count Percentage 
Maximize 
Accuracy 
18 11 61% 7 39% 
Minimize Effort 21 10 48% 11 52% 
Minimize 
Negative Emotion 
16 9 56% 7 44% 
Maximize Ease of 
Justification 







Figure 3.1: Recommendation Strategies 
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Figure 3.2: Disguise and Equipment 
Neon pink hat: 
Audio-recording device attached to keychain: 
 Shopping List: 
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Figure 3.4: Recommendation Process Model 
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4 Conclusion 
In this dissertation, we sought to contribute to the sales and sales management 
literature, as well as self-other decision-making literature by examining the 
recommendation behavior of multi-line salespeople. In the first essay, we draw upon the 
control systems framework, as well as the legitimacy literature and social learning theory 
to examine external controls and explain why salespeople may recommend a particular 
manufacturer’s products to customers relative to competitors’ products. In the second 
essay, we integrated field observations and previous literature across disciplines to 
examine the process of how salespeople make recommendations for customers. 
The theoretical framework of the first essay is tested using a unique data set 
compiled from three different sources (salespeople, sales managers, and manufacturer 
objective sales data) across two hierarchical levels (salespeople and sales managers) and 
across many distributors. To estimate the model, we used Mplus version 7 (Muthén and 
Muthén 2012) because of its ability to analyze complex hierarchical models using full 
maximum likelihood estimation. We first fit a baseline model with only the effects of 
salesperson external controls on focused performance through focused effort (Table 2.5, 
Model 1). We then created interaction terms by multiplying mean-centered salesperson 
external controls by mean-centered manager external controls (Aiken and West 1991). 
Then, we estimated the full hypothesized model, including the cross-level moderators 
(Table 2.5, Model 2). Standard fit indexes were not available for comparing nested 
models with Mplus; therefore, as is common practice, we compared the fit of these 
models using a log-likelihood difference test (e.g., Hughes and Ahearne 2010; Wieseke et 
al. 2012). The hypothesized model including cross-level moderators fits better than the 
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nonmoderated model (Δχ2 = 26.48, Δd.f. [number of free parameters] = 16, p ≤ .05), 
indicating that the inclusion of the Level 2 variables (i.e., manager external controls) into 
the model predicts the outcome variables better than a model with only within-level 
variables (i.e., salesperson external controls).  
The results of the full hypothesized model indicated that manager external 
outcome control positively interacts with salesperson external outcome control to 
influence focused effort (β = .07, p ≤ .05), providing support for H1. H2 is also supported; 
manager external behavior control positively interacts with salesperson external behavior 
control to influence focused effort (β = .03, p ≤ .01). Manager external behavior control 
has little impact on the relationship between salesperson external outcome control and 
focused effort (β = –.01, n.s.); thus, H3 is not supported. However, in support of H4, the 
results indicate that manager external outcome control negatively interacts with 
salesperson external behavior control to influence focused effort (β = –.04, p ≤ .05). 
Finally, focused effort is positively related to focused performance, in support of H5 (β = 
.32, p ≤ .05).  
Despite the prevalence of external controls in practice, prior research has mostly 
focused on internal controls. Accordingly, we complement and extend the existing 
controls literature by advancing the concept of external controls. In doing so, we make 
three key contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to theory and empirical 
research in the area of within-level control systems. Marketing scholars have made 
significant contributions to the within-level internal control systems literature (e.g., 
Anderson and Oliver 1987; Jaworski 1988) (Table 2.2). However, a complementary 
stream of research on within-level external control systems is missing. Second, although 
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internal and external controls share some similarities, they we suggest an important way 
in which they differ. Internal controls stem from employers, which obligates salespeople 
to accede to their influence (e.g., Ouchi 1980). In contrast, external controls are 
nonobligatory influences from an outside source. Thus, the freedom to accede to the 
influence of external controls can give way to salespeople’s concerns about their 
appropriateness and legitimacy. Third, we provide evidence that the impact of controls at 
lower levels of analysis (e.g., salespeople) largely depends on the type of control at 
higher levels of analysis (e.g., sales managers). This is because salespeople look to their 
manager for cues to alleviate the tension they experience from external controls. 
Correspondingly, we find that similar manager external controls have a reinforcing effect 
on the salesperson’s external controls such that focused effort is enhanced. Notably, 
however, increasing sales manager external outcome control undermines the relationship 
between salesperson external behavior control and focused effort. This suggests that 
external rewards to another person (e.g., sales manager) can undermine one’s own (e.g., 
salesperson) intrinsic motivation. Thus, we provide a potential “cross-level” extension to 
cognitive evaluation theory, which suggests parallel effects at the within-level of analysis 
(Deci, Koestner, and Ryan 1999). Taken together, these findings begin to address calls 
from the literature to better understand how control systems interplay at different levels 
of analysis (e.g., Coughlan and Joseph 2012; Krafft et al. 2012; Miao and Evans 2013). 
The insights provided in the second essay are based on a grounded theory 
approach (e.g, Glaser and Straus 1967; Spiggle 1994; Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 
1990). In particular, we covertly audio-recorded 71 sales encounters with retail 
salespeople in their natural setting (i.e., retail stores), across 71 different locations of 
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three different retail chains and four different states. Such an approach allowed the 
salesperson-customer experience to unfold naturally (Belk, Sherry, and Wallendorf 
1988), which affords a richer knowledge of the topic area and data that is not contrived 
(Wilson 2001). Moreover, this approach lends credibility to our findings by producing 
unfiltered, naturalistic data, which does not suffer from informants’ limited memory 
recall (Finn 2001), discrepancies between reported and actual behavior, and a variety of 
desirability biases that may occur with surveys, off-site interviews, and focus groups 
(Friedrichs and Ludtke 1975). Audio-recordings of each of the 71 sales encounters were 
transcribed for further analysis. 
We independently read the entire set of transcripts to get a general sense for the 
nature of the encounters (Spiggle 1994). Over numerous meetings, we discussed 
emerging themes and patterns across the 71 encounters, and debated their distinctiveness 
and relevance to the topic (Canniford and Shankar 2013; Celsi, Rose, and Leigh 1993; 
Schouten and McAlexander 1995). An initial, overarching recommendation process 
emerged which consisted of six large categories. Similar to Bone, Christensen, and 
Williams (2014), Holt (1995), and McQuarrie, Miller, and Phillips (2013), we used the 
iterative, constant comparison procedure to contrast and differentiate the categories, as 
well as compare them to existing literature across disciplines (Glaser 1956). As a result of 
this procedure, the original six categories were collapsed into a three-step process model 
consisting of goals, strategies, and recommendations. We refined the dimensions of each 
step (i.e., the five different strategies within the strategy step) through reference to 
literature and our field study (e.g., Schilpzand, Hekman, and Mitchell 2014).  
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This research inductively generates a self-other decision-making process with 
which salespeople provide a recommendation. Our observations suggest three steps in the 
process: goals, strategies, and recommendations. In the first step, salespeople are 
motivated by four recommendation goals: maximizing accuracy, minimizing effort, 
minimizing negative emotions, and maximizing the ease of justification. In comparison to 
the self decision-making process, our findings suggest that these goals differ with respect 
to their prevalence. Self decision-makers tend to be driven more often by maximizing 
accuracy or minimizing effort (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998), whereas our results 
indicate that self-other decision-makers are driven more often by minimizing negative 
emotions and maximizing ease of justification. Furthermore, unlike self decision-making 
in which goals are signaled by the use of particular strategies (Bettman, Luce, and Payne 
1998), we propose that goals can be signaled by communication facets. Thus, we provide 
an additional way to infer underlying self-other decision-making goals. 
Based on observation, we also identify five strategies that salespeople use to 
process information. Lexicographic and equal weight strategies are consistent with 
previous research. However, our research suggests that these two strategies can be further 
categorized by their locus – as either self (processing based on the salesperson’s 
preferences) or self-other (processing based on the integration of the salesperson’ and 
customer’s preferences). 
We also observe and identify a fifth recommendation strategy, product 
homogenization, which prior research has not identified. Surprisingly, our findings 
revealed that salespeople across all three retailers were quick to homogenize products 
despite the wide range of products and manufacturers represented on the floor. Unlike the 
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known self decision-making strategies in which customers attempt to differentiate 
products, the product homogenization strategy consists of salespeople attempting to make 
products seem more similar. Thus, this strategy complicates the decision-making process 
by making it more difficult for customers to recognize a dominant product to purchase. In 
fact, customers may be less likely to purchase any product if they do not feel confident 
that the salesperson can recognize a dominant one to fit their needs.  
The final step of the process involves the recommendation a salesperson provides 
to the customer. Our data suggest three types of recommendations: definitive (i.e., 
recommend a single product), narrowed (i.e., recommend a limited set of products), and 
refusal (i.e., no products are recommended). Surprisingly, we find that customers seeking 
a salesperson recommendation often fail to get one (as a result of a narrowed 
recommendation or recommendation refusal). Thus, customers are often left with the 
need to spend additional time considering products. 
Through both of these dissertation essays we examine the recommendation 
behavior of multi-line salespeople. In shedding light on this important topic area, several 
areas of further research emerge. First, the recommendation behavior of salespeople (in a 
business-to-business or business-to-consumer setting) is likely to have important 
implications for distributors (and retailers). For example, when should distributors allow 
manufacturers to provide rewards or training to their salespeople and sales managers? On 
the one hand, a distributor may be hesitant to allow a manufacturer to intervene because it 
does not want to relinquish control of salesperson behavior. Moreover, distributors may 
fear that a salesperson’s partiality toward one manufacturer might result in subpar 
customer solutions, lost profit, and alienation of other upstream manufacturer partners. 
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On the other hand, distributors can benefit from manufacturers’ intervention because they 
provide supplemental training and income to their employees, which may increase the 
likelihood of recommendations actually being made, boost employee satisfaction and 
reduce turnover. Thus, further research could address the trade-offs distributors (and 
retailers) face when considering whether or not to allow manufacturer intervention with 
their salespeople. 
Second, distributors and retailers should recognize the lack of consistency with 
which their salespeople make product recommendations to customers. In this dissertation, 
we argue that two factors for this inconsistency may be external controls and variation in 
the recommendation process. The first essay argues that, despite presumably consistent 
sales training by the distributor, salespeople are influenced by external controls; thus, 
they recommend (and sell) the products for which they are rewarded or trained by the 
manufacturer to recommend. This finding suggests that recommendations may vary 
simply based upon which manufacturer offers the highest salesperson and sales manager 
SPIF that particular month. Furthermore, the second essay suggests that salespeople are 
likely to approach recommendations based on their own mental models (e.g., Wind 
2006). This implies that training to improve the extent to which salespeople provide 
accurate recommendations may be effective in teaching salespeople a sales process (e.g., 
what information to provide to customers), but not a recommendation process (e.g., what 
questions to ask, or how to incorporate customer needs into the recommendation 
process). Thus, distributors and retailers should consider monitoring the extent to which 
salesperson recommendations reflect the desires of management. 
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Finally, customers should be cognizant that salespeople can make inaccurate 
recommendations, particularly when they are being influenced by manufacturers or are 
not linking the discussion of products and justifications of their recommendation to 
customer needs. Customers (both business-to-business and business-to-consumer) can 
minimize this concern by being forthright with their preferences and needs, taking steps 
to ensure that a true self-other recommendation is provided (i.e., asking “What product do 
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A1.3: Construct Measures 
 
Focal Variables (loadings are in parentheses) 
Salesperson external outcome control: collected from salesperson (α = .79); adapted from 
Challagalla and Shervani (1996); five -point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly agree”)  
(Manufacturer) and/or its field representative... 
1. …provides me with significant compensation for selling its products. (.88) 
2. …recognizes me when I do a good job selling its products. (.63) 
3. …offers me substantial financial rewards for selling its products. (.83) 
 
Salesperson external behavior control: collected from salesperson (α = .93); adapted 
from Challagalla and Shervani (1996); five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly 
agree”) 
(Manufacturer) and/or its field representative… 
1. …provides me with extensive product training. (.85) 
2. …coaches me on how to sell its products. (.91) 
3. …provides me with sales advice when we go on sales calls. (.88) 
4. …evaluates the skills I use to sell (manufacturer) products. (.79) 
5. …provides me with helpful suggestions on how to demonstrate benefits of their 
products. (.90) 
 
Sales manager external outcome control: collected from manager (α = .80); adapted from 
Challagalla and Shervani (1996); five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly agree”)  
(Manufacturer) and/or its field representative... 
1. ...provides me with significant compensation when my salespeople sell its products. 
(.95) 
2. ...recognizes me when my salespeople do a good job selling its products. (.68) 
3. ...offers me significant financial rewards for sales of its products by my salespeople. 
(.74) 
 
Sales manager external behavior control: collected from manager (α = .94); adapted from 
Challagalla and Shervani (1996); five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly agree”) 
(Manufacturer) and/or its field representative… 
1. ...provides me with extensive product training. (.88) 
2. ...coaches me on how to help my salespeople sell its products. (.91) 
3. ...provides me with sales advice that I can use during sales calls with my salespeople. 
(.93) 
4. ...evaluates the skills I use to help my salespeople sell its products. (.81) 
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5. ...provides me with helpful suggestions on how to demonstrate the benefits of their
products to my salespeople. (.89) 
Focused effort: collected from manager; based on Rapp et al. (2010), Badrinarayanan and 
Laverie (2011), Bonney and Williams (2009), Brown and Peterson (1994), Hughes and 
Ahearne (2010), (α = .89); five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly agree”) 
Relative to other manufacturers’ products that s/he is able to sell, this salesperson… 
1. …frequently looks for opportunities to sell (manufacturer’s) products. (.86) 
2. … proactively seeks out clients to whom they can propose (manufacturer’s) products. 
(.95) 
3. … make calls specifically to customers that might be interested in (manufacturer’s) 
products. (.78) 
Covariates 
Manufacturer’s reputation: collected from salesperson, adapted from Badrinarayanan and 
Laverie (2011) (α = .89); five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly agree”) 
1. (Manufacturer) is a well-respected brand. (.94)
2. (Manufacturer) has a good reputation. (.93)
3. (Manufacturer) is a reputable company. (.78)
Number of manufacturers: collected from salesperson; adapted from Hughes and Ahearne 
(2010)  
1. How many different (product category) manufacturers’ products are you able to sell?
Salesperson experience: collected from salesperson; adapted from Fu, Richards, and 
Jones (2009) 
1. Years of sales experience.
Salesperson internal outcome control: collected from salesperson; adapted from 
Challagalla and Shervani (1996) (α = .77), five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly 
agree”) 
1. I would get bonuses if I exceed my sales volume (.75)
2. Promotion opportunities depend on how well I perform on sales volume. (.66)
3. I would be recognized by my company if I perform well on sales volume. (.83)
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Salesperson internal behavior control: collected from salesperson; adapted from 
Challagalla and Shervani (1996) (α = .93), five-point scale (“strongly disagree/strongly 
agree”) 
1. My manager has standards by which my selling skills are evaluated. (.74) 
2. My supervisor periodically evaluates the selling skills I use to accomplish a task (e.g., 
how I negotiate). (.91) 
3. My manager provides guidance on ways to improve selling skills and abilities. (.90) 
4. My supervisor evaluates how I make sales presentations. (.91) 
5. My manager assists by suggesting why using a particular sales approach may be 
useful. (.89) 
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 A1.4: Popular Press Article 
Article located at:  
http://business.highbeam.com/5338/article-1G1-116151839/not-so-spiffy-don-richie-ceo-
solution-provider-sequel 
Accessed: April 16, 2014 
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A1.5: Job Descriptions 
 
Employer: TireDiscounters  
 













Employer: Empire Today, LLC 
Job Description located at: 
http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobseeker/jobs/jobdetails.aspx?APath=2.21.0.0.0&job_did
=JHS21M66QD62FCS98NG&sc_cmp1=js_jrp_jobclick&IPath=JRKV0A 
Accessed:  April 16, 2014 
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 A2.2: Interview Guide 
1. Which range do you recommend?
2. Why should we buy that one?
3. Do you typically recommend that one?
4. Why should we not buy some of these others?
143 
 




A2.4: Consumer Reports Appliance Testing Information 
Source: http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/about-us/whats-behind-the-
ratings/testing/appliances-home/index.htm 
Accessed March 29, 2015 
How we test: Appliances & Home products 
Readers of Consumer Reports and ConsumerReports.org have plenty to say—last 
year, 127,887 of our readers called, wrote, or e-mailed our customer-relations 
department with comments and questions about the thousands of products we test 
each year. In the home-and-garden area, they wondered about refrigerators that don't 
keep food cold, dishwashers that drown out conversations, and funny-looking twisted 
light bulbs that claim to save energy. 
The occasional rhetorical question arrives in our inboxes, as in "What the heck were 
you thinking?" (Actually, we get that genre of query pretty often, some of them not 
suitable to print here.) 
Here we address some of the common inquiries we get about how we test products 
for the home. If you've got a question about a home-related product, send it to us 
athome@cro.consumer.org. 
How do you pick the models you test? 
We try to test models that represent the spectrum of products in a given market. Our 
analysts seek out products with new features and technological advances and a wide 
range of prices. After they analyze market share, marketing strategy, and advertising 
and promotional materials, they contact manufacturers to determine whether items 
will be available for at least three months after a report is published. The analysts 
then recommend a list of models that managers in our technical and editorial 
divisions review. 
During the next step, staff shoppers buy the products at retail outlets throughout the 
Northeast—our offices are in the suburbs of New York City—or online, never 
revealing that the purchases are for Consumer Reports. (We want to ensure that we 
test the same products you'll buy.) When we need to buy best-selling regional brands, 
we use shoppers across the country. Most significant, and unlike most other 
publications, we buy everything we test. 
In rare instances, when a product isn't in stores yet, we buy it from the manufacturer, 
revealing this in our report. We'll subsequently test a version that we buy at retail and 
report on those findings. 
How do you test? 
Our experts develop tests that re-create the experience you'll have with the product. 
They also consider industry standards for testing a particular product. Note that those 
tests usually gauge only a minimum level of performance while our tests aim to find 
the highest-performing products. We develop tests for those products that lack 
industry standards for ease of use. 
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In some cases, an industry models its tests on ours. For example, we developed an 
emissions test for vacuums that determines how much dirt and dust blows into the air 
when a model is running. The industry then devised its own test that's based on ours, 
and now that test is the industry standard. 
What do you do if a product malfunctions or breaks during the test? 
When either happens, we buy two more of the same product. If the new versions do 
not exhibit the same problem and we suspect the original problem was a quality-
control issue, we base the results on the models that performed correctly. And we 
chalk up the problem to an isolated issue. If either or both of the new samples 
exhibits the same problems, we make a judgment on whether it is a flaw in quality 
control or design and factor that into our Ratings. 
A product-design flaw means that most consumers will experience problems with this 
item, while quality-control issues—materials, assembly, packaging, shipping—
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